American University Law Review
Volume 69

Issue 5

Article 7

2020

Facebook's Speech Code and Policies: How They Suppress
Speech and Distort Democratic Deliberation
Joseph T. Thai
University of Oklahoma College of Law, thai@ou.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr
Part of the First Amendment Commons, and the Internet Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Thai, Joseph T. (2020) "Facebook's Speech Code and Policies: How They Suppress Speech and Distort
Democratic Deliberation," American University Law Review: Vol. 69 : Iss. 5 , Article 7.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr/vol69/iss5/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews
at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
American University Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ American University Washington
College of Law. For more information, please contact kclay@wcl.american.edu.

Facebook's Speech Code and Policies: How They Suppress Speech and Distort
Democratic Deliberation

This article is available in American University Law Review: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr/vol69/
iss5/7

FACEBOOK’S SPEECH CODE AND
POLICIES: HOW THEY SUPPRESS SPEECH
AND DISTORT DEMOCRATIC
DELIBERATION
JOSEPH THAI*
With nearly two and a half billion users—a third of the world’s population—
Facebook far and away hosts the largest speech platform in the history of
humanity. In the United States, seven out of ten adults use it, and nearly half
get news from it. It is therefore no exaggeration to observe that Facebook’s selfpromulgated rules for “what is and is not allowed on Facebook,” its contentbased Community Standards, rival if not exceed the First Amendment’s
importance in shaping discourse in the United States. Yet, unlike the First
Amendment, which only protects against government censorship, no scholarship
has scrutinized the Community Standards’ private regulation of speech on
Facebook’s far-reaching social media platform. As a result, basic questions about
Facebook’s sprawling speech code remain unexamined. For instance, at a
minimum, do they offer enough clarity to ordinary users and prevent arbitrary
or discriminatory moderation? Are they coherent and consistent as a whole?
Furthermore, what do they reveal about the nature of Facebook’s professed
“commitment to expression”? And how do the Community Standards compare—
for better or for worse—with modern First Amendment principles?
This Article inaugurates scholarly consideration of these basic questions
about the Community Standards in the critical context of the spread of deliberate
falsehoods and other disinformation on the platform to influence the electorate.

* Watson Centennial Chair in Law and Presidential Professor, The University of
Oklahoma. I am grateful to the organizers and editors of this timely symposium for their
exceptional work, to my copanelists Evelyn Aswad, David Hudson, and Stephen
Wermiel for their insightful presentations and feedback, to my family—human,
canine, and feline—for their tolerance and support, and to Stephen Colbert and
Trevor Noah for their late night comedy breaks during the drafting of this Article.
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Spoiler alert: Facebook’s speech code suffers from a basic lack of clarity and do
not embody a coherent or consistent commitment to expression. Indeed, in many
respects, the Community Standards suppress significantly more speech—
including a wide range of political speech—than the First Amendment would
permit of government censors.
In addition, Facebook categorically exempts “politicians” from its Community
Standards as well as its fact-checking policy out of “respect for the democratic process.”
But this selective hands-off approach perversely skews public debate by amplifying the
expressive power of already dominant speakers in our society. Politicians enjoy an
unrestricted license to exploit Facebook’s vast reach and highly effective ad targeting
tools to spread expedient falsehoods among the most receptive users.
Making matters worse, Facebook by design does not broaden or balance public
discussion but maximizes user engagement through algorithmically feeding
users content tailored to their interests and likes. Many users thereby end up in
politically imbalanced, self-reinforcing content bubbles where sensational
falsehoods can gain credibility and velocity. While Facebook’s special solicitude
for politicians and polarizing personalized feed might advance the company’s
political and business interests, they also promote a race to the bottom among
willing politicians and further divide the electorate into balkanized realities
based on “alternative facts.”
Ultimately, Facebook’s speech code and policies for its social media platform
present serious shortcomings, particularly in the electoral context. There is much
room—and need—for further scrutiny.
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INTRODUCTION
Facebook’s user growth has exploded since its launch from a Harvard
dormitory in 2004. By the end of its first year, the social media platform had
attracted more than one million monthly users.1 Four years after launch,
Facebook hit 100 million users.2 Another four years later, in 2012, it
surpassed one billion users.3 Now, in its fifteenth year, nearly a third of
humanity—2.45 billion out of 7.6 billion people—regularly uses Facebook.4
By comparison, Facebook has acquired more users in less than two decades
than Christianity has followers after two millennia.5 No other platform for
sharing or spreading speech in our digital age—or any age—comes close
to matching Facebook’s planetwide reach.6
As a result, Facebook’s self-promulgated rules for what content can
or cannot be published on its platform regulate more speakers than
any other speech regime in the history of humanity. Those sprawling

1. See Kurt Wagner & Rani Molla, Facebook’s First 15 Years Were Defined by User
Growth, VOX (Feb. 5, 2019, 11:15 AM), https://www.vox.com/2019/2/4/18203992/
facebook-15-year-anniversary-user-growth [https://perma.cc/2JRA-3U75].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See Josh Constine, Facebook Shares Rise on Strong Q3, Users Up 2% to 2.45B,
TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 30, 2019, 4:15 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2019/10/30/
facebook-earnings-q3-2019 [https://perma.cc/7FEU-8C7V]; U.S. and World Population
Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 27, 2020, 1:32 PM), https://www.census.gov/
popclock [https://perma.cc/FNU5-2HTU].
5. See Conrad Hackett & David McClendon, Christians Remain World’s Largest Religious
Group, But They Are Declining in Europe, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 5, 2017), https://
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/05/christians-remain-worlds-largest-religious-groupbut-they-are-declining-in-europe [https://perma.cc/TVE7-AXAE] (reporting a population of
2.3 billion Christians worldwide in 2015).
6. Two out of the next four largest digital speech platforms are owned by
Facebook: WhatsApp, a messaging service with over 1.5 billion users, and Instagram, a
photo and video sharing service with around a billion users. See Josh Constine,
WhatsApp Hits 1.5 Billion Monthly Users. $19B? Not So Bad, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 31, 2018,
5:15 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/01/31/whatsapp-hits-1-5-billion-monthlyusers-19b-not-so-bad [https://perma.cc/Z7K2-L6MR]; Esteban Ortiz-Ospina, The Rise
of Social Media, OUR WORLD DATA (Sept. 18, 2019), https://ourworldindata.org/riseof-social-media [https://perma.cc/3X3Y-83MC]. YouTube, owned by Google, has a
user base of nearly two billion, and WeChat, a Chinese messaging, social media, and
payment platform, has around one billion users. Id. As part of its “Great Firewall,”
China blocks Facebook, WhatsApp, and Instagram, among other platforms. See Ariel
Hochstadt, The Complete List of Blocked Websites in China & How to Access Them,
VPNMENTOR https://www.vpnmentor.com/blog/the-complete-list-of-blocked-websites
-in-china-how-to-access-them [https://perma.cc/EFJ6-UPDR].
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rules, published as Facebook’s Community Standards,7 presently
regulate the speech of well over two billion more speakers than the
First Amendment.8 Moreover, while the First Amendment protects
around 330 million people in the United States from government
censorship, it does not restrict private individuals or companies from
censoring speech on their own property, including their social media
platforms.9 Consequently, the seven in ten U.S. adults and half of U.S.
teens who use Facebook subject their speech to its Community Standards
without any First Amendment protection.10 And yet, while countless works
of scholarship have been devoted to the freedom of speech protected by
the First Amendment, none to date have engaged in a sustained
examination or evaluation of Facebook’s speech code despite its
unprecedented reach.11 This Article inaugurates that endeavor.
7. See Community Standards, FACEBOOK https://www.facebook.com/community
standards [https://perma.cc/VZJ7-UQR8].
8. The population of the United States in July of 2019 exceeded 331 million. See
U.S. and World Population Clock, supra note 4.
9. See Dawn C. Nunziato, The Death of the Public Forum in Cyberspace, 20 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1115, 1116–17 (2005).
10. See Monica Anderson & Jingjing Jiang, Teens, Social Media & Technology 2018,
PEW RES. CTR. (May 31, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2018/05/ 31/
teens-social-media-technology-2018 [https://perma.cc/2WZK-N2L7]; Andrew Perrin
& Monica Anderson, Share of U.S. Adults Using Social Media, Including Facebook, Is Mostly
Unchanged Since 2018, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/
fact-tank/2019/04/10/share-of-u-s-adults-using-social-media-including-facebook-ismostly-unchanged-since-2018 [https://perma.cc/CF2S-X4RN].
11. To be sure, a growing body of legal scholarship has examined the free-speech
implications of the rise of online services such as social media platforms as fora for
speech. For example, many have argued for the extension of First Amendment,
legislative, or other legal protections to speech on such private platforms. See, e.g.,
Benjamin F. Jackson, Censorship and Freedom of Expression in the Age of Facebook, 44 N.M.
L. REV. 121 (2014); Jonathan Peters, The “Sovereigns of Cyberspace” and State Action: The
First Amendment’s Application—or Lack Thereof—to Third-Party Platforms, 32 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 989 (2017); Colby M. Everett, Comment, Free Speech on Privately-Owned Fora:
A Discussion on Speech Freedoms and Policy for Social Media, 28 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 113
(2018); Mason C. Shefa, Comment, First Amendment 2.0: Revisiting Marsh and the QuasiPublic Forum in the Age of Social Media, 41 U. HAW. L. REV. 159 (2018). Few have
cautioned against doing so. See, e.g., Julian N. Eule & Jonathan D. Varat, Transporting
First Amendment Norms to the Private Sector: With Every Wish There Comes A Curse, 45 UCLA
L. REV. 1537, 1539 (1998). Others have decried uncertainty over whether popular
social media platforms might qualify as protected public fora. See Leading Cases,
Packingham v. North Carolina, 131 HARV. L. REV. 233, 233 (2017). However, no
scholarly work has engaged in a sustained examination of Facebook’s Community
Standards as a governing set of speech rules, either on their own merits or in
comparison to First Amendment principles and norms. Cf. Sarah C. Haan, Facebook’s
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Part I of this Article presents an overview of the nature of the
Community Standards and examines content restrictions in four
representative subject areas—violence and incitement, dangerous
individuals or organizations, hate speech, and adult nudity and sexual
health. To illuminate the contours and value choices of these content
restrictions, this Part compares them with familiar First Amendment
principles in related areas. This comparison reveals that Facebook’s
professed “commitment to expression”—touted as “paramount” at the
outset of its Community Standards12—often conflicts with a speech code
that in critical parts is significantly less clear, less coherent, and more
restrictive than the First Amendment. Most notably, through problematic
do-not-post rules, the Community Standards broadly prohibit content
that many community members may find offensive in order to promote
user satisfaction and retention.
Part II then examines how, beyond the Community Standards,
Facebook’s policies distort democratic deliberation. Foremost, Facebook
privileges the speech of “politicians” through categorically exempting
them from its Community Standards as well as its fact-checking policy.
This approach perversely skews public debate in favor of an already
dominant class of speakers in our society by empowering them alone to
speak freely and falsely on the far-reaching platform. Furthermore,
Facebook facilitates the viral spread of falsehoods by feeding users
personalized content algorithmically narrowed to their interests and likes.
This personalized feed migrates many users into politically imbalanced,
self-reinforcing content bubbles and enables willing politicians to
leverage powerful ad targeting that pushes disinformation to the
multitudes most receptive to them. Thus, while Facebook’s policies might
advance its business interests, they divide and distort public discussion.
In the end, this Article will hopefully demonstrate the pressing need
for further study of Facebook’s unprecedented speech code and
policies that shape the speech of billions of people, including
disinformation that may undermine democratic self-governance.

Alternative Facts, 105 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 18, 20 (2019) (arguing that “Facebook’s
adoption of the alternative-facts frame” through the use of “related articles” and other
responses to misinformation “potentially contributes to the divisiveness that has made
social media misinformation a powerful digital tool”).
12. See Community Standards, supra note 7.

1646

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:1641

I. FACEBOOK’S COMMUNITY STANDARDS
According to Facebook, its Community Standards set out “the rules
for what content is and isn’t permitted on Facebook.”13 This Part discusses
the avowed goals and values of Facebook’s speech code and scrutinizes its
problematic content restrictions in four representative areas.
A. A Qualified “Commitment to Expression,” Not to the First Amendment
The Introduction to the Community Standards states that the goal “has
always been to create a place for expression and give people a voice,” so
they can “talk openly about the issues that matter to them, even if some
may disagree or find them objectionable.”14 This “commitment to
expression”—which Facebook also brands in Silicon-valley speak as
“commitment to voice”—assertedly serves not only to enable users to
“connect with friends and family” but also to promote the utopian aims of
“[b]uilding community and bringing the world closer together.”15
Indeed, because Facebook’s “commitment to expression is paramount,”
the company professes to permit some content that “would otherwise go
against our Community Standards” if “it is newsworthy and in the
public interest.”16 However, apart from this limited newsworthiness
exception, the Community Standards do not set out any explicit
protection of “expression” or “voice” that would give users some
affirmative right to free speech on Facebook.
On the other hand, noting that “the internet creates new and
increased opportunities for abuse,” the Community Standards
explicitly “limit expression” in furtherance of certain “values”:
• “Authenticity,” which “creates a better environment for sharing”
and opposes users “misrepresent[ing] who they are or what
they’re doing”;
• “Safety,” which excludes content that “has the potential to
intimidate, exclude or silence others”;

13. Writing Facebook’s Rulebook, FACEBOOK (Apr. 10, 2019), https://about.fb.com/
news/2019/04/insidefeed-community-standards-development-process [https:// perma.cc
/366J-KT37]; see also Community Standards, supra note 7 (explaining Community Standards
“outline what is and is not allowed on Facebook”).
14. Community Standards, supra note 7.
15. Id.
16. Id. This exception is discussed infra Section II.B.
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• “Privacy,” which includes “personal privacy and information”
and permits users to “choose how and when to share on
Facebook”; and
• “Dignity,” which calls on users to “respect” and “not harass or
degrade others.”17
In the entirety of the Community Standards, there is not a single
reference to the text, principles, or values of the First Amendment,
despite more than a century’s worth of precedents and scholarship on
its protections of the fundamental right of free speech.18 For example,
the Community Standards’ public avowal of a “commitment to
expression” and “commitment to voice” does not reference the most
widely accepted justifications for the robust protection of speech
under the First Amendment—promoting truth-seeking, democratic
self-governance, autonomy, and self-expression.19 Nor do the
Community Standards purport to adopt, adapt, or otherwise rely on
the “core postulate of free speech law” forbidding censorship based on
disagreement with the message or viewpoint.20 Indeed, as discussed in
Section I.B, the Community Standards directly contravene this core
postulate in many ways, including in censoring political speech based
on potential offense to user sensitivities. Accordingly, the conspicuous
absence of a Facebook “like” or “tag,” so to speak, to the most
prominent and celebrated speech protection in the United States does
not seem accidental. And it is not.

17. Community Standards, supra note 7.
18. The modern interpretation of the First Amendment is commonly recognized
to have begun with the Supreme Court’s review of free speech challenges to Espionage
Act convictions during World War I. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52
(1919) (describing the “clear and present danger” test); Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that only “the present danger
of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about” warrants limitations on expression).
19. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
1006–10 (6th ed. 2019); KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, FIRST AMENDMENT
LAW 5–9 (6th ed. 2016); Justin Marceau & Alan K. Chen, Free Speech and Democracy in
the Video Age, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 991, 999 (2016).
20. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2297, 2299 (2019) (invalidating the Lanham
Act’s prohibition on the registration of “‘immoral or scandalous’ trademarks”); see
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn. 505 U.S. 377, 430 (1992) (“If there is a bedrock
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit
the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable. Viewpoint discrimination is censorship in its purest form” (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted)).
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For one, in the Introduction to its Community Standards, Facebook
touts how it “take[s] great care” to write and regularly revise its speech
rules in light of “feedback from our community” as well as consultation
with experts “in fields such as technology, public safety and human
rights.”21 Notably absent from this primary list of consulted fields is either
free speech, generally, or the First Amendment, specifically. Other
Facebook articles that discuss how the company’s “policy,” “product,” and
“operations” teams continually evolve the Community Standards to
“account for a range of perspectives and opinions across the globe” also
fail to acknowledge consultation with scholars on the freedom of
expression.22 It is only at the end of its Community Standards that
Facebook sets out a longer list of “stakeholders” with whom it engages,
including “civil society organizations, activist groups, and thought leaders”
in areas such as “digital and civil rights, anti-discrimination, free speech,
and human rights.”23 In this laundry list of stakeholders, free speech
experts do not occupy a “paramount“ place, and mention of the First
Amendment is again noticeably avoided.
This absence of acknowledgment of First Amendment principles, norms,
or expert consultation may seem unsurprising in one respect, as the
company’s speech platform serves billions of international users not
protected by nor likely familiar with the constitutional provision. However,
in publicly defending its content moderation policies in the face of
domestic criticism, Facebook’s executives have not shied from invoking
robust free speech rhetoric that echoes modern First Amendment
principles and norms.24 Furthermore, in leaked audio from an internal
employee forum, Facebook founder, CEO, and chair Mark Zuckerberg
related essentially domestic political considerations for avoiding any
modeling of the Community Standards after the First Amendment. Despite
plenty of scholars and commentators calling for Facebook and other
social media platforms to adopt First Amendment rules or norms,25
21. Community Standards, supra note 7.
22. Promoting Safety with Policy, Product and Operations, FACEBOOK (Nov. 15, 2018),
https://about.fb.com/news/2018/11/inside-feed-community-integrity-keeping-people-safe
[https://perma.cc/XSA6-K4TA]; Writing Facebook’s Rulebook, supra note 13; see also Standing
Against Hate, infra note 76 (discussing how Facebook did not mention consulting with free
speech or First Amendment experts in developing policy against white nationalism).
23. Stakeholder Engagement, Community Standards, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook
.com/communitystandards/stakeholder_engagement [https://perma.cc/4K7T-UX9J].
24. See infra notes 147–48, 192.
25. See supra note 11 and accompanying text; see also David L. Hudson, Jr., In the
Age of Social Media, Expand the Reach of the First Amendment, ABA, https://
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Zuckerberg responded to an employee asking whether it should do so
by asserting that “I don’t think anyone says . . . that we should [follow
the] First Amendment.”26 Instead, Zuckerberg explained, “a lot of
people think that we need to be more aggressive in moderating
content that is offensive or basically would make certain groups of
people feel unsafe.”27 However, with respect to “political discourse,”
Zuckerberg asserted that a “lot of people” feel that those “arbitrating what
is misinformation and doing fact-checking tend to be left of center” and
are “getting in the way of an ability to express something that they feel is
real and that matches their lived experience.”28 As a result, Facebook’s
content moderation gets pressure from “different sides” and “tr[ies] to
navigate this as well as possible.”29
Zuckerberg’s views matter greatly not only because he occupies the
very top executive positions within Facebook, but also because he has
always possessed controlling shares of the company30 and lately has
been the most vocal defender of its speech rules.31 Moreover, the two
sentiments he expressed above—needing to police “offensive” or
“unsafe” content aggressively, while “giv[ing] people a voice” to
express “their lived experience” without fact checking “getting in the
way”—align more neatly with how the Community Standards censor
some kinds of speech while countenancing others than with any
coherent or consistent “commitment to expression.” In other words,
as discussed in Part II, the Community Standards in critical parts seem
to reflect Facebook’s attempt to politically “navigate” the pressure it
receives from “different sides” to promote user satisfaction and
otherwise protect its business interests.

www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/th
e-ongoing-challenge-to-define-free-speech/in-the-age-of-socia-media-first-amendment
[https://perma.cc/FBV6-AZN5].
26. See Casey Newton, Why Facebook Doesn’t Follow the First Amendment, VERGE (Oct. 10,
2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/facebook/2019/10/10/20906304/ facebookfirst-amendment-political-ads-leaked-audio [https://perma.cc/A3BB-WDPH].
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See Emily Stewart, Facebook Will Never Strip Away Mark Zuckerberg’s Power, VOX (May
30, 2019, 2:38 PM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/5/30/18644755/facebook-stockshareholder-meeting-mark-zuckerberg-vote [https://perma.cc/74AJ-UCTB].
31. See Mark Zuckerberg Stands for Voice and Free Expression, FACEBOOK (Oct. 17, 2019),
https://about.fb.com/news/2019/10/mark-zuckerberg-stands-for-voice-and-freeexpression [https://perma.cc/D8DZ-2YQT].
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B. The Rules for “What Is and Is Not Allowed”
Facebook divides its rules for “what is and is not allowed” into five major
content categories: “Violence and Criminal Behavior,” “Safety,”
“Objectionable Content,” “Integrity and Authenticity,” and “Respecting
Intellectual Property.”32 These primary categories are further divided into
subtopics, for a total of over twenty subject areas in which Facebook
significantly restricts speech. Subtopics usually open with a broad “Policy
Rationale” for censorship within that subject area and follow with a list of
“Do not post” rules of varying length and breadth.
Given the multitude and diversity of speech restrictions across the
sprawling Community Standards, it is not possible to scrutinize them
all in this Article. Instead, this Section examines four representative subject
areas in which Facebook restricts speech—violence and incitement,
dangerous individuals or organizations, hate speech, and adult nudity and
sexual health. This survey exposes the considerable lack of clarity and
coherence that characterizes the Community Standards as well as the
Standards’ notably wide differences from First Amendment principles—
differences that often result in considerably less speech protection.
The “Violence and Criminal Behavior” category of the Community
Standards hosts the rules restricting speech in five subject areas. To
give context to an examination of two of those areas, all five are listed
in the table below alongside the main policy rationales offered by the
Community Standards for censorship within them.33

32. Community Standards, supra note 7.
33. The quoted policy rationales are usually the first sentences introducing each subtopic.
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Table 1: Violence and Criminal Behavior
Subtopic
Violence and Incitement

Dangerous Individuals and
Organizations

Coordinating Harm and
Publicizing Crime

Regulated Goods

Policy Rationale
“We aim to prevent potential
offline harm that may be related
to content on Facebook. While
we understand that people
commonly express disdain or
disagreement by threatening or
calling for violence in nonserious ways, we remove
language that incites or
facilitates serious violence.”34
“In an effort to prevent and
disrupt real-world harm, we do
not allow any organizations or
individuals that proclaim a
violent mission or are engaged
in violence to have a presence
on Facebook.”35
“In an effort to prevent and
disrupt offline harm and
copycat behavior, we prohibit
people from facilitating,
organizing, promoting, or
admitting to certain criminal or
harmful activities targeted at
people, businesses, property or
animals.”36
“To encourage safety and
compliance with common legal
restrictions, we prohibit

34. Violence and Incitement, Community Standards, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook
.com/communitystandards/credible_violence [https://perma.cc/8CY5-S5XB].
35. Dangerous Individuals and Organizations, Community Standards, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/dangerous_individuals_organizati
ons [https://perma.cc/A42G-RLT5].
36. Coordinating Harm and Publicizing Crime, Community Standards, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/coordinating_harm_publicizing_c
rime [https://perma.cc/GX7U-EP5H].
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attempts by individuals,
manufacturers, and retailers to
purchase, sell, or trade nonmedical drugs, pharmaceutical
drugs, and marijuana. We also
prohibit the purchase, sale,
gifting, exchange, and transfer
of firearms, including firearm
parts or ammunition, between
private individuals on
Facebook.”37
“In an effort to prevent and
disrupt harmful or fraudulent
activity, we remove content
aimed at deliberately deceiving
people to gain an unfair
advantage or deprive another of
money, property, or legal
right.”38

1.

Violence and incitement
Whether or not by design, the first listed subtopic, “Violence and
Incitement,” exemplifies how and why the Community Standards
aggressively censor speech. The subtopic opens with a “Policy Rationale”
that generally declares the aim to “prevent potential offline harm that may
be related to content on Facebook” without specifically justifying the
substance or reach of any of the restrictions in this area.39 The text also does
not articulate an overarching rule, standard, or test for what constitutes
forbidden speech under this subtopic. Instead, the Community Standards
generally describe the forbidden speech as “language that incites or facilitates
serious violence,” “direct threats to public safety,” or speech that otherwise
raises “a genuine risk of physical harm” without defining any of those terms.40
The Community Standards further note some content that would not fall
37. Regulated Goods, Community Standards, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
communitystandards/regulated_goods [https://perma.cc/9FBD-8MES].
38. Fraud and Deception, Community Standards, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.
com/communitystandards/fraud_deception [https://perma.cc/R3FS-65AE].
39. Violence and Incitement, supra note 34.
40. Id.

2020]

FACEBOOK’S SPEECH CODE AND POLICIES

1653

within this subtopic—“casual statements,” “threatening or calling for
violence in non-serious ways,” or non-credible “aspirational or conditional
threats directed at terrorists and other violent actors.”41 More significantly,
under a “Do not post” header, the Community Standards list dozens of kinds
of forbidden content that do not seem organized in any overall order.42
The laundry list of forbidden content includes three classes of threats
associated with different levels of physical severity and different targets:
• “[t]hreats that could lead to death (and other forms of highseverity violence)” against “any target(s)”;
• “[t]hreats that lead to serious injury (mid-severity violence)
towards private individuals, minor public figures, high risk
persons, or high risk groups”; and
• “[t]hreats that lead to physical harm (or other forms of lowerseverity violence) towards private individuals (self-reporting
required) or minor public figures.”43
Accompanying these threat proscriptions are bans against advocacy
of corresponding levels of violence: ”[s]tatements advocating for highseverity violence,” “[c]alls for mid-severity violence,” and “calls for . . .
low-severity violence.”44
In several respects, this cluster of proscribed threats and incitements
showcases the frequent lack of clarity and coherence in the
Community Standards as well as their significant differences from First
Amendment protections.
First, key terms often are not defined, illustrated, or otherwise
elucidated, leaving their application unclear at best. For example, while
“death” does not need further explanation, it is hardly obvious what
constitutes high-severity violence as opposed to mid-severity violence, as
neither expression comes from common parlance or First Amendment
doctrine. Would a punch in the nose count as one or the other?
Alternatively, would a slap on the cheek amount to mid-severity violence

41. Id.
42. The haphazard nature of this “Do not post” list is punctuated by
inconsistencies or errors in punctuation. For example, while all the listed items are
sentence fragments, some end in periods while others do not, and spaces sometimes
are not inserted where needed (e.g., after a comma) and inserted where not needed
(e.g., after an opening parenthesis). See id. These observations may seem like nitpicking, but they reinforce the impression that the Community Standards are not
especially refined in substance or presentation.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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or lower-severity violence, or would it not rise to any level of “serious
violence” that could result in censorship? Furthermore, if a threat or
advocacy of mid-severity violence is made against a minority group, such as
the Black Student Association, would it qualify as a prohibited threat against
a “high risk group”? Relatedly, could threats or advocacy of lower-severity
violence freely target minority groups, since this tier expressly protects only
“private individuals” and “minor public figures”?45 In addition, since these
do-not-post rules address “minor public figures” (undefined) but do not
mention other kinds of public figures, how would threats or incitements
against non-minor (major?) public figures fare? While threats or advocacy
of death or high-severity violence are banned against any target, would
those involving mid-severity violence or lower-severity violence—say, threats
or calls to punch, slap, or milkshake a major celebrity or politician46—
escape Facebook censorship? Again, answers to these questions do not
emerge from everyday understanding or First Amendment doctrine.
Second, from the standpoint of either “prevent[ing] potential offline harm”
or upholding a “commitment to expression,”47 it is difficult to discern a
coherent explanation for various lines drawn in this list of prohibited
threats, and the Community Standards provide none. As highlighted, one
line that they implicitly—if perhaps unintentionally—draw is between
threats or advocacy of death or high-severity violence against non-minor
public figures, which are banned, and threats or advocacy of mid-severity or
low-severity violence against the same figures, which are not. It is not
apparent why the balance between expression and safety tips in favor of the
former when major public figures (Oprah Winfrey? Bernie Sanders?) are
targeted only with mid-severity violence or lower-severity violence. Nor is it
apparent why threats or calls for violence against “high risk groups” or “high
risk persons” (whoever they are) are specifically forbidden for mid-severity
violence but implicitly allowed for lower-severity violence.48 It is also not
obvious why private individuals are required to self-report threats or advocacy
of lower-severity violence, but minor public figures are not.49

45. Cf. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 188 (1978) (applying the maxim “expressio
unius est exclusio alterius,” i.e., “the expression of one thing is the exclusion of the other”).
46. See Iliana Magra, Why Are Milkshakes Being Thrown at Right-Wing Politicians Like
Nigel Farage?, N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/21/
world/europe/milkshake-nigel-farage.html.
47. Community Standards, supra note 7; Violence and Incitement, supra note 34.
48. Violence and Incitement, supra note 34.
49. Presumably, “self-reporting” means reporting threats against oneself, not
threats one has made. If so, then another line needs explaining: why require self-
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The violence and incitement subtopic also notably bars “statements
of intent, calls for action, or advocacy for high or mid-severity violence
due to voting, voter registration, or the outcome of an election.”50 By
omission, the Community Standards seemingly allow statements of
intent or advocacy of lower-severity violence with respect to voting,
voter registration, or the outcome of an election. But if there is an
overriding interest in protecting the exercise of the fundamental right
to vote from violence, it is neither apparent nor explained why that
interest gives way to speech threatening or advocating less severe forms
of violence. This line-drawing question is compounded by the lack of
clarity over what constitutes lower-severity violence.
Third, the Community Standards differ substantially from First
Amendment standards. For one, the Supreme Court’s “true threats”
jurisprudence has not made fine distinctions between different severity
levels of violence.51 So far, it has simply described constitutionallyproscribable threats as “those statements where the speaker means to
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of
unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”52
The Court has broadly justified the lack of First Amendment
protection for this undifferentiated category of speech based on the
classic rationale advanced in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire53 for
censorship of certain historical categories of unprotected speech—
they are “of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality.”54 While perhaps a case may be made
for drawing finer distinctions in levels of protection based on the
severity of the threat or the prominence of the target,55 the Community
Standards have not taken this route.

reporting rather than take down threats against private individuals reported by thirdparties or discovered by Facebook moderators?
50. Violence and Incitement, supra note 34.
51. See generally Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707–08 (1969) (per curiam)
(describing factors to be used in interpreting whether a statement is a true threat).
52. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003); see also id. at 360 (“Intimidation in
the constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of true threat, where a
speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the
victim in fear of bodily harm or death.”).
53. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
54. Black, 538 U.S. at 358–59 (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–
83 (1992) (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572)).
55. Cf. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978) (“[C]ontext is all-important.”).
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More significantly, the Community Standards’ ban on advocacy of
violence sweeps much more broadly than incitement that the First
Amendment permits governments to censor. Under the modern test
set forth in Brandenburg v. Ohio,56 advocacy of lawless (including violent)
action receives First Amendment protection “except where such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action
and is likely to incite or produce such action.”57 This stringent, highly
speech-protective test requires both the specific intent (“directed”) to
produce “imminent lawless action” and a showing that such imminent
lawlessness is “likely” to materialize.58 Under this test, “mere advocacy”
of lawless (even violent) action receives First Amendment protection.59
Accordingly, aspirational or conditional calls for lawless action at some
indeterminate point in the future, or which may not occur at all, enjoy
constitutional protection.60 As Justice Brandeis argued in an influential
opinion that prefigured the Brandenburg test, “If there be time to
expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil
by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more
speech, not enforced silence.”61
By contrast, the Community Standards forbid calls for high, mid,
and lower-severity violence without any requirement of imminence or any
other limiting timeframe.62 In addition, the Community Standards target
“credible” threats and incitements as opposed to “non-serious” ones but
do not impose any requirement that the called-for action be likely to come
about.63 Thus, “aspirational or conditional statements” may run afoul of

56. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
57. Id. at 447.
58. See Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine:
Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 755 (1975) (characterizing the Brandenburg test
as the “most speech-protective standard yet evolved by the Supreme Court”).
59. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448–49; cf. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673
(1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“Every idea is an incitement . . . . If in the long run
the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the
dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should
be given their chance and have their way.”).
60. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 446, 449.
61. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see
Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The Brandeis Opinion in
Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653, 682 (1988) (discussing how
Brandeis’s concurrence is frequently invoked by Supreme Court Justices who have
“contributed significantly to the modern elaboration of the free speech principle”).
62. Violence and Incitement, supra note 34.
63. Id.
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the Community Standards64 even if the prospect of violence is unlikely or
there is time “to avert the evil” through counterspeech.65 Consequently, a
call for protesters at a rally months hence to resist counterprotesters with
violence if necessary would likely receive First Amendment protection in
the United States because of its conditionality and lack of imminence but
would likely draw Facebook censorship.
Curiously, the Community Standards do explicitly require a short fuse for
“[m]isinformation that contributes to the risk of imminent violence or
physical harm.”66 Facebook thus would not forbid posting misinformation
about a rally that could contribute to violence or physical harm, so long as
the timeframe is not imminent. While the Community Standards do not
explain this special solicitude for misinformation over public safety in this
context, the policy does align with Zuckerberg’s private acknowledgment
of the need to “navigate” external pressure to “give people a voice to express
their lived experience” without fact-checking “getting in the way.”67
However, this special solicitude comes at a potential cost to the democratic
process that Facebook elsewhere claims to respect.68 The Standards permit,
if not encourage, speakers to spread misinformation that, for example,
could chill voting and other electoral activities by suggesting that nonimminent violence or physical harm could result.
2.

Dangerous individuals and organizations
Under the category of “Violence and Criminal Behavior,” the Community
Standards not only forbid threats and incitements of physical violence but
also ban “any organizations or individuals that proclaim a violent mission or
are engaged in violence, from having a presence on Facebook.”69 The classes
of banned speakers include organizations or individuals involved in
“terrorist activity,” “organized hate,” “mass murder” or “multiple murder,”
“human trafficking,” or “organized violence or criminal activity.”70
Facebook also broadly bans “content that expresses support or praise for
groups, leaders, or individuals involved in these activities.”71

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377.
Violence and Incitement, supra note 34 (emphasis added).
See supra notes 30–31.
See infra note 147; see also infra Part II.
Dangerous Individuals and Organizations, supra note 35.
Id.
Id.
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Notably, with respect to terrorism, the Community Standards ban
both “terrorist organizations” and individual “terrorists” without
regard to their role in any affiliated organization; however, with respect
to hate, they ban only “[h]ate organizations and their leaders and
prominent members.”72 Apparently, the policy aim of “prevent[ing]
and disrupt[ing] real-world harm” does not extend to rank-and-file
members of hate organizations or lone wolves.73
It is easy to appreciate why Facebook would boot terrorist organizations,
hate groups, and their ilk off its platform. In the wake of the violent Unite
the Right rally in Charlottesville74 and resurgence of white supremacists
online, as well as on streets, Facebook and other online platforms faced
tremendous public pressure to do so, including from lawmakers and civil
rights groups.75 Facebook responded with a statement proclaiming that,
after “conversations with members of civil society and academics who
are experts in race relations,” it would continue to allow people to
“demonstrate pride in their ethnic heritage” but “will not tolerate
praise or support for white nationalism and white separatism” in
applying its “Dangerous Individuals and Organizations” standards.76
However, Facebook’s efforts have had decidedly mixed success—in
part because rank-and-file members of banned hate groups can simply
create new pages.77
72. Id.
73. Id. One such lone wolf live streamed his mass shooting at a New Zealand
mosque on Facebook. See Meagan Flynn, No One Who Watched New Zealand Shooter’s Video
Live Reported It to Facebook, Company Says, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2019, 5:04 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/03/19/new-zealand-mosqueshooters-facebook-live-stream-was-viewed-thousands-times-before-being-removed.
74. See What Charlottesville Changed, POLITICO MAG. (Aug. 12, 2018), https://www.
politico.com/magazine/story/2018/08/12/charlottesville-anniversary-supremacistsprotests-dc-virginia-219353 [https://perma.cc/3YMZ-W27J].
75. See David Ingram & Ben Collins, Facebook Bans White Nationalism from Platform
After Pressure from Civil Rights Groups, NBC NEWS (Mar. 27, 2019, 1:06 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/facebook-bans-white-nationalism-afterpressure-civil-rights-groups-n987991 [https://perma.cc/C4Y7-WLM4]; Tony Romm,
A Flood of Online Hate Speech Greets Lawmakers Probing Facebook, Google About White
Nationalism, WASH. POST (Apr. 9, 2019, 10:08 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
technology/2019/04/09/flood-online-hate-speech-greets-lawmakers-probingfacebook-google-about-white-nationalism.
76. Standing Against Hate, FACEBOOK (Mar. 27, 2019), https://about.fb.com/news
/2019/03/standing-against-hate [https://perma.cc/7H8J-BV5N]. Again, tellingly,
Facebook did not mention consulting free speech experts.
77. See Casey Newton, How White Supremacists Evade Facebook Bans, VERGE (May 31,
2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/interface/2019/5/31/18646525/
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Putting aside the efficacy of Facebook’s efforts to ban hate groups,
terrorist groups, and other dangerous organizations and individuals
from its social media platform, the breadth of its censorship of booted
speakers is sweeping. Banned organizations and individuals cannot speak
on Facebook at all, on any topic, whether personal or political, benign or
harmful. They cannot share baby photos or endorse mainstream
candidates any more than they can incite violence or spread hate.
In stark contrast, in cases such as Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission,78 the modern Supreme Court has made clear that, just as
“the First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor certain
subjects or viewpoints,” it also prohibits “restrictions distinguishing
among different speakers, allowing speech by some but not others.”79
The Court views restrictions against speakers skeptically because it is
“all too often simply a means to control content.”80 Consequently, the
Court has held that this general principle applies with special force to
“the suppression of political speech based on the speaker’s identity.”81
Of course, Citizens United has drawn considerable criticism for applying
this general principle to corporate campaign speech,82 but neither
Court decision nor constitutional amendment has overruled it.83
Indeed, of particular relevance, the Court has since applied the First
Amendment’s robust speaker-based protection to invalidate a state’s
categorical exclusion of registered sex offenders from social media.84
facebook-white-supremacist-ban-evasion-proud-boys-name-change [https://perma.cc
/MBG7-FQNJ]; see also Julia Carrie Wong, White Nationalists Are Openly Operating on
Facebook. The Company Won’t Act, GUARDIAN (Nov. 21, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://
www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/nov/21/facebook-white-nationalists-banvdare-red-ice [https://perma.cc/WSW9-HWX6].
78. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
79. Id. at 340; see also id. at 341 (“The Government may not . . . deprive the public
of the right and privilege to determine for itself what speech and speakers are worthy
of consideration.”).
80. Id. at 340–41.
81. Id. at 350.
82. See, e.g., id. at 393–95 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(criticizing the majority opinion as “misguided” and “a dramatic break from our past”);
Barack Obama, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, AM.
PRESIDENCY PROJ. (Jan. 27, 2010), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/
address-before-joint-session-the-congress-the-state-the-union
[https://perma.cc/BYQ6-NSSP].
83. Cf. JOHN PAUL STEVENS, SIX AMENDMENTS: HOW AND WHY WE SHOULD CHANGE
THE CONSTITUTION 57–79 (1st ed. 2014) (arguing for and proposing text of
constitutional amendment to overrule Citizens United).
84. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1733 (2017).
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The challenger there had violated the state ban by using Facebook, to
which the majority opinion of Justice Kennedy (the author of the
Citizens United majority) gave a judicial “like” as one of “the most
important places . . . for the exchange of views” today.85 While the Court
assumed that the state could enact “specific, narrowly tailored laws” to ban
expression that facilitates a sex crime, such as contacting a minor through
social media, the Court declared that the state could not “with one broad
stroke bar[] access to what for many are the principal sources for knowing
current events, checking ads for employment, speaking and listening in
the modern public square, and otherwise exploring the vast realms of
human thought and knowledge.”86
That is precisely the broad stroke Facebook has applied against the
“dangerous individuals and organizations” it has banned. Given the
constraints of space and focus, the point here is not to assess Facebook’s
decision to do so as a private platform owner,87 or to question yet again
the clarity or line-drawing of its rules,88 but to highlight another area in
which its asserted “commitment to expression” differs from and falls far
short of the First Amendment’s commitment.89
Another primary content category in which the Community
Standards restrict speech is “Objectionable Content.” This category is
in turn divided into five subject areas. To give context to an
examination of two of these areas, all five of them and their main policy
rationales are set forth in the table below.

85. Id. at 1734–35.
86. Id. at 1737.
87. But see supra note 11 (highlighting articles arguing that Facebook and other social
media platforms should be treated as public fora subject to the First Amendment).
88. It would be easy to question the line-drawing in this area, including the
decision to allow rank-and-file members of hate organizations to post on the social
media platform, as well as perpetrators of single but not multiple murders, and
perpetrators of other heinous crimes such as serial child rapists, to use Facebook.
89. Cf. T.S. Eliot, The Hollow Men, in SELECTED POEMS 77, 79 (1st ed. 1930)
(“Between the idea/And the reality . . . Falls the Shadow.”).

2020]

FACEBOOK’S SPEECH CODE AND POLICIES

1661

Table 2: Objectionable Content
Subtopic
Hate Speech

Violent and Graphic Content

Adult Nudity and Sexual
Activity

Sexual Solicitation

Policy Rationale
“We do not allow hate speech on
Facebook because it creates an
environment of intimidation and
exclusion and in some cases may
promote real-world violence.”90
“We remove content that
glorifies violence or celebrates
the suffering or humiliation of
others because it may create an
environment that discourages
participation.”91
“We restrict the display of nudity
or sexual activity because some
people in our community may be
sensitive to this type of content.
Additionally, we default to
removing sexual imagery to
prevent the sharing of nonconsensual or underage
content.”92
“We draw the line . . . when
content facilitates, encourages or
coordinates sexual encounters
between adults. We also restrict
sexually explicit language that
may lead to solicitation because
some audiences within our
global community may be
sensitive to this type of content
and it may impede the ability for

90. Hate Speech, Community Standards, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
communitystandards/objectionable_content [https://perma.cc/K9QT-UBQE].
91. Violent and Graphic Content, Community Standards, FACEBOOK, https:// www.
facebook.com/communitystandards/graphic_violence [https://perma.cc/WA9V-GLGD].
92. Adult Nudity and Sexual Activity, Community Standards, FACEBOOK, https://
www.facebook.com/communitystandards/adult_nudity_sexual_activity
[https://perma.cc/PG7N-R522].
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people to connect with their
friends and the broader
community.”93
“We believe that people share
and connect more freely when
they do not feel targeted based
on their vulnerabilities. As such,
we have higher expectations for
content that we call cruel and
insensitive, which we define as
content that targets victims of
serious physical or emotional
harm.”94

3.

Hate speech
In addition to banning hate groups, their leaders, and prominent
members under the “Violence and Criminal Behavior” category of the
Community Standards, Facebook forbids “hate speech” under the
“Objectionable Content” category.95 The Community Standards define “hate
speech” as “a direct attack on people” based on “protected characteristics—
race, ethnicity, national origin, religious affiliation, sexual orientation,
caste, sex, gender, gender identity, and serious disease or disability.”96 The
term “attack” is defined in turn as “violent or dehumanizing speech,
statements of inferiority, or calls for exclusion or segregation.”97
The Community Standards proffer the policy rationale that hate speech
“creates an environment of intimidation and exclusion and in some cases
may promote real-world violence.”98 Censorship in this area also aligns
with Zuckerberg’s assertion to Facebook employees that “a lot of people
think that we need to be more aggressive in moderating content that is
offensive or basically would make certain groups of people feel unsafe.”99

93. Sexual Solicitation, Community Standards, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com
/communitystandards/sexual_solicitation [https://perma.cc/5WYP-CSWH].
94. Cruel and Insensitive, Community Standards, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.
com/communitystandards/cruel_insensitive [https://perma.cc/5MJ4-MX8U].
95. Hate Speech, supra note 90.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Newton, supra note 26.
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The “Do-not-post” section lists dozens of examples of the kinds of
“dehumanizing speech,” “statements of inferiority,” or “calls for exclusion
or segregation” that cross the line. They are ostensibly divided into “three
tiers of severity,” although the degree of censorship—total—is the same.
It is not possible to excerpt a representative sampling of the hodgepodge
of verboten hate speech, but the extensive list includes:
• “Tier 1”: various forms of “violent,” “dehumanizing,” or
“mocking” speech, such as comparisons of a protected
characteristic to insects or other animals perceived as inferior
(e.g., “Black people and apes,” “Jewish people and rats,”
“Muslim people and pigs”), “unqualified behavioral statements”
(e.g., referring to those of a protected characteristic as “violent
and sexual criminals” or “bank robbers”), or referring to
transgender or non-binary people as “it”;
• “Tier 2”: generalizations regarding the “physical,” “mental,” or
“moral” deficiencies of a protected characteristic (e.g., “filthy,”
“ignorant,” or “useless”), “expressions of contempt,” “dismissal,” or
“disgust” (e.g., saying you “despise,” “hate,” “don’t respect,” “don’t
like,” or “don’t care for” a protected characteristic, or that it is
“vile” or “disgusting”), or “cursing” with “the intent to insult”;
• “Tier 3”: negative “slurs” regarding a protected characteristic, or
“calls for segregation” or “exclusion” (including “not allowed”),
except for “criticism of immigration policies and arguments for
restricting those policies,” which are expressly permitted.100
It would be difficult to find a starting—or stopping—point for
questioning the clarity of these motley rules or the justifications for
their line-drawing. For present purposes, it suffices to raise the
problematic nature of these rules and instead focus on the extent to
which they differ from established First Amendment principles and
censor an extraordinary amount of constitutionally protected speech.
For starters, the Court recently reaffirmed “the ‘bedrock First
Amendment principle’ that the government cannot discriminate
against ‘ideas that offend.’”101 Today, this bedrock principle
undoubtedly applies with full force to hate speech, including speech
that “disparage[s] . . . or bring[s] . . . contemp[t] or disrepute” to any

100. Hate Speech, supra note 90.
101. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2299 (2019) (quoting Matal v. Tam, 137 S.
Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017)); see supra note 20.
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persons or classes of people,102 as well as speech that could “arouse[]
anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed,
religion or gender.”103 Indeed, First Amendment protection of speech
that offends—as part of its broader protection against the government
“discriminat[ing] on the basis of viewpoint” or “disfavor[ing] certain
ideas”—is so fundamental that the Court has applied it to bar
censorship of speech that otherwise falls outside the protection of the
First Amendment, such as censorship of “fighting words” on the basis
of their offensiveness rather than their potential to provoke violence.104
As a result, most if not all of the Community Standards’ far-reaching
(if not entirely fathomable) suppression of offensive speech would lie
beyond the censorial power of government.105 For instance, the
Community Standards would forbid users from declaring that “men
are pigs,” that they “don’t like straight people,” or that “blacks
shouldn’t be allowed to vote,” while permitting users to express the
opposing views that “men are not pigs,” that they “like straight people,”
and that “blacks should be allowed to vote.” In light of these
examples—and many more that easily come to mind—Facebook might
credibly claim that it restricts speech that “creates an environment of
intimidation and exclusion,”106 but not that it allows users to “talk
openly about the issues that matter to them, even if some may disagree
or find them objectionable.”107
102. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1751 (quoting the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012)).
103. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380 (1992) (quoting St. Paul Bias-Motivated
Crime Ordinance, St. Paul, Minn., Legis. Code § 292.02 (1990)). Of course, R.A.V. has
received its share of scholarly criticism. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose:
The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 416 (1996)
(discussing some of the “hotly debated” questions that R.A.V. has raised regarding “what
counts, or should count, as the core concern of the First Amendment”); Steven H. Shiffrin,
Racist Speech, Outsider Jurisprudence, and the Meaning of America, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 43, 46
(1994) (arguing that “the Court simply bungled the first amendment job in its most
important encounter with racist speech in the last forty years”).
104. Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2297; see R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 386; cf. Wisconsin v. Mitchell,
508 U.S. 476, 487–88 (1993), rev’d sub nom. State v. Mitchell, 504 N.W.2d 610 (Wis. 1993)
(upholding sentencing enhancement for racially-motivated violence because it punishes
“conduct [that] is thought to inflict greater individual and societal harm” rather than, as in
R.A.V., “a class of ‘fighting words’ deemed particularly offensive by the city”).
105. Of course, though the Community Standards’ rules against offensive speech
may be extraordinarily overbroad on their face, they may be applied to expression that,
in context, may constitute unprotected speech, such as a serious threat of violence
against members of a certain race or sexual orientation.
106. Hate Speech, supra note 90.
107. Community Standards, supra note 7.
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4.

Adult nudity and sexual activity
Another notable subject of expansive Facebook censorship within
the “Objectionable Content” category of the Community Standards is
“Adult Nudity and Sexual Activity.”108 The primary rationale for
restricting the display of nudity or sexual activity, including images of
real people as well as digitally-created content, is that “some people . .
. may be sensitive to this type of content.”109 A secondary rationale is
“to prevent the sharing of non-consensual or underage content.”110
The “Do-not-post” rules ban images in three different areas: “Real
nude adults,” “Sexual activity,” and “Digital content.”111 The
complicated and qualified list of banned imagery includes:
• “Real nude adults” with “visible genitalia” (except in “health-related
situations,” such as “birth giving and after-birth moments,” or
“visible anus and/or fully nude close-ups of buttocks unless
photoshopped on a public figure”); and “uncovered female
nipples” (except in “health-related situations,” such as “postmastectomy, breast cancer awareness or gender confirmation
surgery,” or in the context of “breastfeeding,” “birth giving and
after-birth moments,” or “an act of protest”);
• “Sexual activity” with “explicit sexual intercourse” where at least
one person’s genitals are nude, “implied sexual intercourse” or
“implied stimulation of genitalia/anus” even when not directly
visible (except in “a sexual health context,” “advertisements,” or
“fiction”), other sexual activities (e.g., “erections,” “by-products of
sexual activity,” using “sex toys,” or “squeezing female breast”),
and “fetish content” (e.g., “dismemberment,” “cannibalism,” or
“feces, urine, spit, snot, menstruation, or vomit”);
• “Digital content” that meets any of the above criteria unless
“sexual activity . . . is not directly visible,” content is “satirical,”
“humorous,” “educational,” or “scientific” in context, or “only
body shapes or contours are visible.”112
108. Adult Nudity and Sexual Activity, supra note 92.
109. Id.
110. Id. The “Safety” category of the Community Standards contains rules on “Child
Nudity and Sexual Exploitation of Children,” which already prohibits a host of content
that “sexually exploits or endangers children.” Child Nudity and Sexual Exploitation of
Children, Community Standards, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/community
standards/child_nudity_sexual_exploitation [https://perma.cc/75FY-VP4L].
111. Adult Nudity and Sexual Activity, supra note 92.
112. Id.
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In addition, under the “Policy Rationale,” Facebook states that it
allows “photographs of paintings, sculptures, and other art that depicts
nude figures.”113
Facebook relates that its nudity policies have become “more
nuanced over time,” now recognizing that nudity can be shared to
“raise awareness about a cause,” for “educational or medical reasons,”
or for “protest.”114 The evolution of these policies often followed public
protests and negative press. For example, policies regarding the display
of female breasts have evolved to become less restrictive but more
complicated and not much more coherent. Prior to 2014, Facebook
barred photos of uncovered female nipples categorically, including
breastfeeding photos that show “an exposed breast that is not being
used for feeding.”115 However, following years of protests that included
an organized social media campaign, “nurse-ins” outside of Facebook
offices, and press coverage of the controversy,116 Facebook updated its
Community Standards to allow uncovered female nipples “in the
context of breastfeeding.”117 Similarly, Facebook’s no-uncoveredfemale-nipples rule once barred post-mastectomy photos that showed
the nipple of a breast unaffected by surgery,118 but after years of public
criticism and negative press, Facebook relented to allow them and
other exposed nipple photos “in health-related situations.”119
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Emil Protalinski, Facebook Clarifies Breastfeeding Photo Policy, ZDNET (Feb. 7,
2012, 11:54 PM), https://www.zdnet.com/article/facebook-clarifies-breastfeedingphoto-policy [https://perma.cc/CV6T-82F4].
116. Id.; see Mikaela Conley, Breastfeeding Advocates Protest Facebook with Nurse-In, ABC
NEWS (Feb. 7, 2012, 11:38 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/breastfeedingadvocates-hold-facebook-protest/story?id=15530012 [https://perma.cc/8FJ3-6U4K].
117. Adult Nudity and Sexual Activity, supra note 92; see Does Facebook Allow Photos of
Mothers Breastfeeding?, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/340974655932193
[https://perma.cc/U6DR-8MAC]; see also Soraya Chemaly, #FreeTheNipple: Facebook
Changes Breastfeeding Mothers Photo Policy, HUFFPOST (June 9, 2014, 6:48 PM), https://
www.huffpost.com/entry/freethenipple-facebook-changes_b_5473467
[https://perma.cc/SPG2-NAG9].
118. See Susan Donaldson James, Facebook Allows Mastectomy Photos, Not Nudity, ABC NEWS
(June 12, 2013), https://abcnews.go.com/blogs/health/2013/06/12/facebook-launchesnew-policy-to-allow-mastectomy-photos [https://perma.cc/NPB2-2AY7].
119. Adult Nudity and Sexual Activity, supra note 92; see Jessica Firger, Breast Cancer
Survivor Battles Facebook over Mastectomy Photos, CBS NEWS (May 9, 2014, 4:16 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/breast-cancer-survivor-battles-facebook-overmastectomy-photos [https://perma.cc/MGT7-FLVW]; Margaret Wheeler Johnson,
Facebook Revises Wording of Policy on Post-Mastectomy Photos, HUFFPOST (June 12, 2013,

2020]

FACEBOOK’S SPEECH CODE AND POLICIES

1667

After these and other modest changes to Facebook’s nudity
policies,120 the Community Standards still draw a sharp censorial line
between the display of nude male breasts, which generally are allowed,
and nude female breasts, which generally are not, with a handful of
exceptions. Indeed, the censorial line between female and male
breasts extends beyond nudity, as the Community Standards forbid any
display of “[s]queezing female breast,” even if clothed, whereas it
allows images of male breasts being squeezed in any state of
(un)dress.121 This differential treatment has led to continued criticism
of Facebook for maintaining content policies that reflect and reinforce
gender discrimination and sexualized objectification of the female
body.122 For instance, to put this differential treatment on public
display, nude female protestors laid in front of Facebook headquarters
with their nipples covered by stickers of male nipples and their
genitalia covered by larger prints of male nipples, thereby absurdly
ensuring that posted photos of their protests would comply with
Facebook’s nudity policies.123
Much more could be written about the lack of clarity, coherence, or
justification for the many questionable lines drawn in the “Adult
Nudity and Sexual Activity” subject area beyond its fixation with female
4:59 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/facebook-mastectomy-photos-allowed_n
_3428602 [https://perma.cc/US65-HUEV]; see also Does Facebook Allow Post-Mastectomy
Photos?, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/318612434939348 ?helpref=uf
_permalink [https://perma.cc/H95X-SUEW].
120. The Community Standards now also exempt displays of uncovered female
nipples in the context of “gender confirmation surgery” or “an act of protest.” Adult
Nudity and Sexual Activity, supra note 92; see supra note 112 and accompanying text.
121. See Adult Nudity and Sexual Activity, supra note 92; supra note 112 and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., Kari Paul, Naked Protesters Condemn Nipple Censorship at Facebook
Headquarters, GUARDIAN (June 3, 2019, 3:09 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2019/jun/03/facebook-nude-nipple-protest-wethenipple
[https://perma.cc/2AV7-DS2G].
123. Id. Displays of topless females (sans stickers) in this context might also fall
within the exemption for “an act of protest.” However, it is not clear that the
exemption applies to protests of Facebook’s policies as opposed to (other) political
protests. See Megan Farokhmanesh, Facebook Sure Has Been Thinking a Lot About Nipples,
VERGE (Apr. 24, 2018, 1:23 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/4/24/17275
114/facebook-community-guidelines-nipples-nudity [https://perma.cc/E53V-E247];
Sophie Roberts, The Breast Explanation: What Is Free the Nipple, What Celebrities Are
Involved, Is It Illegal to Go Naked in Public, and What Counts as Graphic Content on Facebook?,
SUN (Mar. 26, 2019, 9:00 PM), https://www.thesun.co.uk/fabulous/2778411/free-thenipple-campaign-celebrity-supporters-laws-illegal-facebook-instagram
[https://perma.cc/QR2S-MT69].
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breasts. For example, ordinary users cannot post images of “[i]mplied
sexual intercourse” or “[i]mplied stimulation of genitalia,” even when
“the activity is not directly visible,” despite the significance of sexuality in
expression and Facebook’s “commitment to voice.”124 Yet the Community
Standards nakedly exempt advertisers from these rules, despite
Facebook’s overall policy rationale for censoring speech in this area to
protect the sensitivities of community members.125 That communitarian
concern apparently takes a back seat to advertising dollars.126
Furthermore, while Facebook updated its policies in 2018 to allow
“photographs of paintings, sculptures, and other art that depicts nude
figures,” photographs of real-life nude models still apparently do not
qualify as “other art,” no matter how creative or acclaimed.127 Thus,
incongruously, users may post photos of artistic nude figures but not
artistic nude photos.128
The Community Standards also offer no guidance on what kinds of
imagery of sexual activity count as exempted “cases of a sexual health
context” (a video on the sex positivity of masturbation?), what qualifies
as “educational” digital content (a fetish video could be eye-opening
to the uninitiated), or how to assess the many other lines that the
Community Standards attempt to draw in this area.129 And there is no
mention of verbal, as opposed to visual, imagery of sexual activity,

124. See Andrew Koppelman, Is Pornography “Speech”?, 14 LEGAL THEORY 71 (2008)
(arguing that pornography cannot be distinguished from art as protected speech); cf.
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (“For, while the particular four-letter word
being litigated here is perhaps more distasteful than most others of its genre, it is
nevertheless often true that one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.”).
125. Adult Nudity and Sexual Activity, supra note 92; Community Standards, supra note 7.
126. Cf. RUSH, The Big Money, on POWER WINDOWS (Mercury Records 1985) (“Big
money got a mighty voice”). Rest in peace, Neil Peart.
127. Matthew Robinson, Facebook to Meet #WeTheNipple Campaigners Amid Nudity Censorship
Row, CNN (June 6, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/style/article/facebook-wethenippleprotesters-meeting-intl-scli/index.html [https://perma.cc/QER2-RSVP]; Michael Zhang,
Facebook to Reconsider Nudity Policy After Photographers Protest, PETAPIXEL (June 6, 2019),
https://petapixel.com/2019/06/06/facebook-to-reconsider-nudity-policy-afterphotographers-protest [https://perma.cc/AC8S-2T87]. These articles report that
Facebook promised to hold a meeting with photographers and other protestors to discuss
its nudity policies, but expressly declined to promise any policy changes.
128. Would a photo of an artistic nude photo (perhaps hanging in a museum)
qualify, or only a photo of nudity in non-photographic mediums such as paintings and
sculptures? That this question can be asked—but not answered—again illustrates the
lack of clarity and coherence that pervades the Community Standards.
129. Adult Nudity and Sexual Activity, supra note 92.
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which of course can be quite graphic and offensive to the sensibilities
of “some people” in the vast Facebook community.130
Regardless of where precisely (or not) these various lines might fall,
they individually and collectively fall far from the line of unprotected
obscenity under the First Amendment. After all, the multipronged test
from Miller v. California131 for obscenity narrowly requires that the
average person applying contemporary community standards finds
that the work “appeal[s] to the prurient interest,” that it depicts statedefined “sexual conduct in a patently offensive way,” and that, taken as
a whole, the work lacks “serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.”132 While this First Amendment test is not without its critics133 or
ambiguities,134 none of Facebook’s broad do-not-post rules even attempt
to limit their application to materials that are “prurient” or “patently
offensive” (case-in-point: the ban on uncovered female nipples). Nor do
any of the rules against adult nudity contain a safety valve for works with
“literary, artistic, political, or scientific value” (beyond a peculiarly
limited allowance for photoshopped buttocks on public figures).135
Indeed, it is difficult to identify a single do-not-post rule in this area
that does not sweep beyond obscenity.
Facebook has justified its wide-ranging censorship of nudity and
sexual imagery by asserting that its rules “closely mirror[] the policy
that governs broadcast television.”136 But this assertion is inaccurate.
The Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) prohibition of
“indecent” content on broadcast television and radio, while broader
than obscenity under the Miller test, nevertheless requires that a
depiction of “sexual or excretory organs” be “patently offensive as
measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast
medium.”137 Furthermore, what the FCC considers “patently offensive”
is informed by three “significant” factors: the “explicitness or graphic
130. Id.
131. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
132. Id. at 24.
133. See, e.g., David A.J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of
the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 72 (1974) (arguing that “[a]n understanding of
the moral function of the first amendment compels a conclusion” that the Miller decision
finding obscenity outside first amendment protection is wrong).
134. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, at 1113–14 (critiquing the ambiguity of the
“prurient interest” and “patently offensive” prongs).
135. See Adult Nudity and Sexual Activity, supra note 92.
136. Protalinski, supra note 115.
137. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 246 (2012); see Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
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nature” of the depiction, the extent to which the material “dwells on
or repeats at length” the sexual or excretory organs, and whether the
content appears to “pander,” “titillate,” or is presented for “shock
value.”138 By contrast, none of the Community Standards’ do-not-post
rules limit their applicability to content that is “patently offensive” or
incorporate any of the factors that inform the FCC’s analysis.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has upheld the FCC’s regulation of
indecency in broadcast television and radio because of broadcasting’s
“uniquely pervasive presence” and easy accessibility to children.139
These rationales do not fit as neatly in the social media context, where
children’s access depends on the more affirmative (and, in theory,
adult-assisted) steps of obtaining an internet connection, opening a
social media account, and signing in.
In the end, Facebook’s extensive censorship in the areas of violence
and incitement, dangerous organizations and individuals, hate speech,
and adult nudity and sexual activity illustrate not only the lack of clarity,
consistency, and coherence of its speech code, but moreover the extent
to which the company’s touted “commitment to expression”140 is
substantially qualified by its asserted interests in promoting safety, dignity,
and inclusion, as well as in avoiding offense to user sensitivities.141 This
aggressive censorship is consistent with Zuckerberg’s internal explanation
to employees that “a lot of people think that we need to be more
aggressive in moderating content that is offensive.”142 Such censorship
promotes Facebook’s recently stated aim of improving user satisfaction so
that they “feel positive, rather than negative, after visiting,” thereby
increasing their likelihood of coming back.143

138. Fox, 567 U.S. at 246. In Fox, the FCC unsuccessfully sought to apply this
standard to the television broadcast of fleeting expletives and a scene showing the
nude buttocks of a female character. The Court held that the FCC’s application of the
“indecency” standard to those instances violated the Due Process Clause for lack of fair
notice and, therefore, declined to address the First Amendment implications of the
agency’s policy. See id. at 258.
139. Id. at 244 (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748–49 (1978)).
140. See Community Standards, supra note 7.
141. See supra notes 17, 109 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text.
143. Mike Isaac, Facebook Overhauls News Feed to Focus on What Friends and Family Share,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2018) https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/11/technology/
facebook-news-feed.html.
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II. FACEBOOK’S POLICIES ON POLITICIANS, POLITICAL SPEECH,
AND FALSEHOODS
As the foregoing Part illustrates, the Community Standards’
extensive censorship of the speech of billions of users worldwide makes
Facebook’s speech code one of the most impactful in human history.
But just as important as what Facebook censors through its Community
Standards is who Facebook exempts from that censorship: politicians.
This Part examines how Facebook’s special treatment of politicians
and their falsehoods interacts with its personalized news feed and
powerful ad targeting tools to optimize the platform for the viral
spread of disinformation that promotes the company’s business
interests but grossly distorts democratic deliberation.
A. Controversies
At first blush, Facebook’s “commitment to expression” seems most fully
realized in its highly public resistance to suppressing political speech on its
platform. Indeed, Facebook unfailingly invokes the robustness of that
commitment in justifying its refusal to take down false or misleading
political speech—including deliberate lies to influence the electorate—
despite mounting criticism in the face of high-profile controversies.
For example, Facebook refused to take down an ad by President
Donald Trump’s 2020 reelection campaign asserting that his potential
democratic rival, former Vice President Joe Biden, “promised Ukraine
$1 billion if they fired the prosecutor investigating his son’s
company.”144 Though CNN refused to air the ad because it made
“assertions that have been proven demonstrably false” by fact-checkers
at various news outlets, including CNN itself,145 Facebook rejected the
Biden campaign’s request to take the ad off its platform.146 Facebook
explained that “when a politician speaks or makes an ad,” the company
does not subject the content to its fact-checking policies because of its
“fundamental belief in free expression, respect for the democratic
144. Donald J. Trump, Biden Corruption, YOUTUBE (Sept. 27, 2019), https://
youtu.be/bbixdV2F6Ts [https://perma.cc/G7AN-WNVH]; see Michael M. Grynbaum
& Tiffany Hsu, CNN Rejects 2 Trump Campaign Ads, Citing Inaccuracies, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/03/business/media/cnn-trump-camp
aign-ad.html; Cecilia Kang, Facebook’s Hands-Off Approach to Political Speech Gets
Impeachment Test, N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/
08/technology/facebook-trump-biden-ad.html?auth=login-email&login=email.
145. Grynbaum & Hsu, supra note 144.
146. Kang, supra note 144.
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process, and the belief that, in mature democracies with a free press,
political speech is already arguably the most scrutinized speech there
is.”147 Likewise, this refusal aligns with a fall 2019 policy address by
Zuckerberg at Georgetown University, “Standing For Voice and Free
Expression.”148 He asserted that the company neither fact checks nor
takes down speech by politicians “even if it would otherwise conflict
with many of our standards,” because “people should be able to see for
themselves what politicians are saying,” and “I don’t think it’s right for
a private company to censor politicians or the news in a democracy.”149
Similarly, the company refused to take down a doctored video of
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi that had drawn millions of views on a
conservative group’s Facebook page and spread virally across Twitter
and YouTube.150 The video had been edited to slow Pelosi’s speech
while retaining its pitch so that her words sounded drunkenly
slurred.151 As it spread, the video drew comments highlighting and
mocking her apparent drunkenness.152 News organizations and
independent fact-checking groups deemed the video fake, and
YouTube removed it.153 However, Facebook explained that “[w]e don’t
have a policy that stipulates that the information you post on Facebook
must be true.”154 Instead, the company stated that it would reduce the
video’s appearance in users’ news feeds and surface links alongside it
to fact checking and additional reporting on the video.155

147. Donie O’Sullivan (@donie), TWITTER (Oct. 8, 2019, 11:58 PM), https://
twitter.com/donie/status/1181780966806839297 [https://perma.cc/V2BA-EW36]. This
is the same explanation the company gives for exempting posts and ads from politicians
from its fact-checking policy. See infra notes 187–88 and accompanying text.
148. Mark Zuckerberg Stands for Voice and Free Expression, supra note 31.
149. Id.
150. See Drew Harwell, Faked Pelosi Videos, Slowed to Make Her Appear Drunk, Spread
Across Social Media, WASH. POST (May 24, 2019, 4:41 PM), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/technology/2019/05/23/faked-pelosi-videos-slowed-make-her-appear-drunkspread-across-social-media.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. Drew Harwell, Facebook Acknowledges Pelosi Video Is Faked But Declines to Delete It, WASH.
POST (May 24, 2019, 4:17 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/ 2019/05/
24/facebook-acknowledges-pelosi-video-is-faked-declines-delete-it; see Miriam Valverde,
Viral Video of Nancy Pelosi Slowed Down Her Speech, POLITIFACT (May 24, 2019), https://
www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2019/may/24/politics-watchdog/viralvideo -nancy-pelosi-speech-was-manipulated [https://perma.cc/H3JL-86JX].
154. Harwell, supra note 153.
155. Id.
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The company’s refusal to remove false and misleading political
content on its platform has drawn fierce public criticism from many
quarters, including political and technology writers,156 prominent
opinion pages,157 Facebook’s own employees,158 and lawmakers.159 Most
of the latter have been Democratic politicians, who have frequently found
themselves targets of misinformation spread by President Trump or other
right-wing critics.160 One notable response came from Senator Elizabeth
Warren, a Democratic candidate in the 2020 presidential election, who
posted a fake ad claiming that “Mark Zuckerberg and Facebook just
endorsed Donald Trump for re-election.”161 The ad went on to disclose
that the claim was false and criticize Zuckerberg for giving Trump “free
rein to lie on his platform—and then to pay Facebook gobs of money
to push out their lies to American voters.”162
156. See, e.g., Sue Halpern, Facebook’s False Standards for Not Removing a Fake Nancy
Pelosi Video, NEW YORKER (May 28, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/tech/annals-oftechnology/facebooks-false-standards-for-not-removing-a-fake-nancy-pelosi-video
[https://perma.cc/S6J7-7D3J]; Emily Stewart, Facebook’s Political Ads Policy Is Predictably
Turning Out to Be a Disaster, VOX (Oct. 30, 2019, 4:57 PM), https://www.vox.com
/recode/2019/10/30/20939830/facebook-false-ads-california-adriel-hamptonelizabeth-warren-aoc [https://perma.cc/8EHD-W4K3].
157. See, e.g., Aaron Sorkin, Aaron Sorkin: An Open Letter to Mark Zuckerberg, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 31, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/31/opinion/aaron-sorkin-markzuckerberg-facebook.html.
158. Mike Isaac, Dissent Erupts at Facebook over Hands-Off Stance on Political Ads, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/28/technology/facebookmark-zuckerberg-political-ads.html.
159. See id.
160. See, e.g., Jeff Horwitz, Pelosi Slams Facebook over Altered Video, WALL ST. J. (May 29,
2019, 6:38 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/pelosi-slams-facebook-over-alteredvideo-11559164773?mod=article_inline; Cecilia Kang & Mike Isaac, Biden Escalates
Attack on Facebook over False Political Ads, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/18/technology/biden-facebook-ad.html; Sarah
Mervosh, Distorted Videos of Nancy Pelosi Spread on Facebook and Twitter, Helped by Trump,
N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/24/us/politics/
pelosi-doctored-video.html; Craig Timberg et al., A Facebook Policy Lets Politicians Lie in
Ads, Leaving Democrats Fearing What Trump Will Do, WASH. POST (Oct. 10, 2019, 4:31
PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/10/10/facebook-policypolitical-speech-lets-politicians-lie-ads.
161. Dan MacGuill, Did Elizabeth Warren’s Campaign Say Mark Zuckerberg Had Endorsed
Trump?, SNOPES (Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/liz-warrenzuckerberg-trump [https://perma.cc/DVG4-E8B4]; see Madeleine Carlisle, Elizabeth
Warren Targets Facebook’s Ad Policy with a Fake Ad Claiming Mark Zuckerberg Endorsed
Trump’s Re-Election, TIME (Oct. 12, 2019), https://time.com/5699122/elizabethwarren-facebook-fake-ad-mark-zuckerberg [https://perma.cc/5GDH-Z46U].
162. Carlisle, supra note 161.
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On the other side, conservatives from Trump on down have
criticized Facebook and other online platforms for what they perceive
to be liberal bias in content moderation.163 Even though no credible
evidence of systemic bias exists,164 they have pointed to instances such
as Facebook fact-checking as “inaccurate” an anti-abortion video
claiming that “abortion is never medically necessary.”165 Facebook
ended up removing the fact-checking label and supporting links after
Republican senators sent it a letter of complaint.166 Episodes like this
undoubtedly informed Zuckerberg’s assertion to employees that, in
the arena of “political discourse,” a “lot of people feel” that those
“arbitrating what is misinformation and doing fact-checking tend to be
left of center” and are “getting in the way of an ability to express
something that they feel is real.”167
In answer to the growing criticism of its platform from “different
sides” leading up to the 2020 elections,168 Facebook has reaffirmed its
basic policies regarding political speech but also adopted some
consequential and controversial new ones, including its general
exemption of politicians from its Community Standards.

163. See, e.g., David Shepardson, Facebook, Google Accused of Anti-Conservative Bias at
U.S. Senate Hearing, REUTERS (Apr. 10, 2019, 5:35 PM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-usa-congress-socialmedia/facebook-google-accused-of-anti-conservativebias-at-u-s-senate-hearing-idUSKCN1RM2SJ [https://perma.cc/E888-L2SC].
164. See Mathew Ingram, The Myth of Social Media Anti-Conservative Bias Refuses to Die,
COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Aug. 8, 2019), https://www.cjr.org/the_media_today/
platform-bias.php [https://perma.cc/ATG8-9X44].
165. Isobel Asher Hamilton, Facebook Removed a Fact-Check on an Anti-Abortion Video After
Republican Senators Including Ted Cruz Complained, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 13, 2019, 6:27 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-removes-anti-abortion-factcheck-aftersenators-complain-2019-9 [https://perma.cc/E4GY-G55Z].
166. Id.
167. See Newton, supra note 26. Facebook also faced conservative criticism in 2016
when it used to serve “Trending” topics at the top of its News Feed, which excluded
stories covered by conservative outlets such as Breitbart unless the same stories were
also covered by mainstream news sites such as the New York Times. See Haan, supra note
11, at 23. Facebook’s response to this criticism—the elimination of human editors and
reliance on algorithm-made selections based on popularity among users—amplified
false news stories during the 2016 election cycle. See id. at 23–24.
168. See Newton, supra note 26.
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B. Policies
Just as no provision of the Community Standards guarantees users any
general right of expression on Facebook,169 no provision affirmatively
protects political speech on the platform. Indeed, with one notable
exception, political speech does not appear to receive any special
protection in the Community Standards. It is permitted to the same
extent as speech on any other subject, including personal ones such as
vacation photos or cat videos. As the Introduction to the Community
Standards states, users can “talk openly about the issues that matter to
them”—political, personal, or otherwise—so long as they do not
violate any of the content-moderation rules.170
The notable exception lies in the Introduction to the Community
Standards, which does not protect political speech per se, but states, “In
some cases, we allow content which would otherwise go against our
Community Standards—if it is newsworthy and in the public interest.”171
Critically, Facebook does not define what is “newsworthy” or “in the public
interest.” However, the company does hedge that it makes allowances
“only after weighing the public interest value against the risk of harm,” and
it “look[s] to international human rights standards”—not First
Amendment standards—“to make these judgments.”172
For ordinary users, it appears remarkably difficult even for
exceptionally newsworthy content to qualify. For instance, Facebook
took down the Pulitzer Prize-winning photograph “Napalm Girl” from
the Vietnam War, shared by a Norwegian writer posting about photos
that “changed the history of warfare,” for violating the Community
Standards’ rules against nudity generally as well as child nudity.173
Facebook confirmed that the platform’s human editors, rather than
algorithms, made the call to take down the photo.174 It was only after
169. See supra Section I.A.
170. See Community Standards, supra note 7.
171. Id.
172. Id. The Community Standards Introduction does not specify which
international human rights standards it consults. Cf. Evelyn Mary Aswad, The Future of
Freedom of Expression Online, 17 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 26, 26 (2018) (exploring what
online platforms would need to do to comply with Article 19 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, “the key international standard for protecting
freedom of expression”).
173. Aarti Shahani, With ‘Napalm Girl,’ Facebook Humans (Not Algorithms) Struggle to Be
Editor, NPR (Sept. 10, 2016, 11:12 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/alltech
considered/2016/09/10/493454256 [https://perma.cc/KWU4-Z7CU].
174. See id.
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global criticism from news organizations, media experts, and even the
Norwegian prime minister, who reposted the photo on Facebook, that
the company reversed itself.175 But not every newsworthy post by an
ordinary user can claim the public interest value of a Pulitzer Prize or
inspire a worldwide campaign in support of its newsworthiness.
By contrast, the posts or ads of politicians would not need any such
backing. Facebook publicly declared in the run-up to the 2020 election
that it would apply this newsworthiness exemption categorically to the
posts and ads of “politicians.” It announced that “from now on we will
treat speech from politicians as newsworthy content that should, as a
general rule, be seen and heard.”176 Additionally, Facebook affirmed
that the platform categorically “exempts politicians from our thirdparty fact-checking program.”177
As background, the company started fact-checking news in the
spring of 2017, following revelations that the platform amplified false
news stories and significantly promoted the spread of Russian
disinformation in the 2016 election.178 Even though Zuckerberg
initially dismissed criticism that Facebook “influenced the election in
any way” as “a pretty crazy idea,”179 the company subsequently declared

175. See id.; see also Sam Levin et al., Facebook Backs Down from ‘Napalm Girl’ Censorship
and Reinstates Photo, GUARDIAN (Sept. 9, 2016, 1:44 PM), https://www.the
guardian.com/technology/2016/sep/09/facebook-reinstates-napalm-girl-photo
[https://perma.cc/87AP-7JY4].
176. Nick Clegg, Facebook, Elections and Political Speech, FACEBOOK (Sept. 24, 2019),
https://about.fb.com/news/2019/09/elections-and-political-speech
[https://perma.cc/END3-8L4N].
177. Id.
178. See Joseph Thai, The Right to Receive Foreign Speech, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 269, 270–72 (2018).
179. Casey Newton, Zuckerberg: The Idea that Fake News on Facebook Influenced the
Election Is ‘Crazy’, VERGE (Nov. 10, 2016, 9:10 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2016/
11/10/13594558/mark-zuckerberg-election-fake-news-trump [https://perma.cc/8K
36-4MN6]. But see Margaret Sullivan, Facebook’s Role in Trump’s Win Is Clear. No Matter
What Mark Zuckerberg Says., WASH. POST (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/lifestyle/style/facebooks-role-in-trumps-win-is-clear-no-matter-what-markzuckerberg-says/2017/09/07/b5006c1c-93c7-11e7-89fa-bb822a46da5b. Zuckerberg
since apologized for not doing enough to prevent the spread of “fake news” and
“foreign interference in elections.” See Danielle Kurtzleben, Did Fake News on Facebook
Help Elect Trump? Here’s What We Know, NPR (Apr. 11, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://
www.npr.org/2018/04/11/601323233/6-facts-we-know-about-fake-news-in-the-2016election [https://perma.cc/78YF-N2T7].
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that it is “committed to fighting the spread of false news”180 as “a tool
for economic or political gains” that is “bad for people and bad for
Facebook.”181 Accordingly, the company adopted a “Fact-Checking on
Facebook” policy.182 In partnership with third-party fact-checkers, the
company now attempts to identify false news content (defined as
“factually inaccurate” or “misleading”), reduce its distribution and
lower its appearance in users’ feeds, flag it with a warning about its
falsehood, and notify users trying to share it of additional reporting.183
So far, Facebook has not disclosed enough data to assess the extent to
which its fact checking has stemmed the proliferation of falsehoods on its
platform.184 However, critics have contended that Facebook has not
devoted nearly enough resources to address the escalating problem.185
Furthermore, several of its fact-checking partners have quit in frustration,
concerned that their work was “not a priority” and the company was “more
interested in making themselves look good and passing the buck.”186
In any case, Facebook’s refusal to fact-check “[p]osts and ads from
politicians” effectively gives them a license to lie on the platform.187 This
license applies to current officeholders and candidates “at every level”—
180. Fact-Checking on Facebook: What Publishers Should Know, FACEBOOK, https://
www.facebook.com/help/publisher/182222309230722?ref=MisinfomrationPolicyPag
e [https://perma.cc/D25T-MLBQ].
181. Tessa Lyons, Hard Questions: What’s Facebook’s Strategy for Stopping False News?,
FACEBOOK (May 23, 2018), https://about.fb.com/news/2018/05/hard-questionsfalse-news [https://perma.cc/5USS-SJ2L].
182. Fact-Checking on Facebook, supra note 180.
183. Id. The fact-checking policy indicates that repeat offenders are subject to
additional steps, such as having the distribution of their pages and domain reduced or
(after further violations) revoked. Id.
184. Mathew Ingram, Facebook’s Fact-Checking Program Falls Short, COLUM. JOURNALISM
REV., Aug. 2, 2019, https://www.cjr.org/the_media_today/facebook-fact-checking
.php [https://perma.cc/E95F-UFYG].
185. See Chris Mills Rodrigo, Critics Fear Facebook Fact-Checkers Losing Misinformation
Fight, THE HILL (Jan. 20, 2020, 7:30 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/
478896-critics-fear-facebook-fact-checkers-losing-misinformation-fight
[https://perma.cc/VX4Z-ZKMQ].
186. Sam Levin, ‘They Don’t Care’: Facebook Factchecking in Disarray as Journalists Push
to Cut Ties, GUARDIAN (Dec. 13, 2018, 3:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2018/dec/13/they-dont-care-facebook-fact-checking-in-disarray-asjournalists-push-to-cut-ties [https://perma.cc/KC7R-KWJB].
187. Fact-Checking on Facebook, supra note 180. Facebook qualifies that this
exemption only applies to the “direct speech” of politicians, rather than to content
that they pass on, such as links to an article or video “created by someone else.” Id. But
a politician can easily skirt this qualification by repeating or endorsing a false claim
made by someone else.
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presumably from President of the United States to dog catcher of
Duxbury, Vermont—but does not apply to former candidates, former
officials, or unaffiliated super political action committees (so-called
super PACs).188 Consequently, campaigns with the financial resources can
leverage Facebook’s powerful ad targeting tools and deep user knowledge
to spread politically expedient disinformation to the multitude of voters
most receptive to them.189 Facebook does not deny this.
Indeed, Twitter’s CEO Jack Dorsey acknowledged this very danger
when his company banned all political ads on its platform. He warned
that “machine learning-based optimization of messaging and microtargeting” can spread “unchecked misleading information” at
“increasing velocity, sophistication, and overwhelming scale” that
“today’s democratic infrastructure may not be prepared to handle.”190
Similarly, in recommending that online platforms ban microtargeting
of political ads, Federal Election Commission Chair Ellen Weintraub
sounded the alarm against algorithms that make it “easy to single out
susceptible groups and direct political misinformation to them with little
accountability, because the public at large never sees the ad.”191
188. Id.; see Scott Detrow, ‘You Couldn’t Get Elected Dogcatcher!’ No, Seriously, NPR (Apr. 7,
2018, 8:45 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/04/07/600482792/you-couldn-t-get-electeddogcatcher-no-seriously [https://perma.cc/YSP5-TU8S]. The policy indicates that
“politicians” exempt from its fact-checking at least include “candidates running for office,
current office holders—and, by extension, many of their cabinet appointees—along with
political parties and their leaders.” Fact-Checking on Facebook, supra note 180.
189. See Sue Halpern, The Problem of Political Advertising on Social Media, NEW YORKER
(Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-technology/theproblem-of-political-advertising-on-social-media
[https://perma.cc/M3Z6-HWJQ]
(“Facebook’s tools, and its unprecedented cache of data, allows marketers—both
commercial and political—to test various approaches and identify users who are most
susceptible to their message.”); Kevin Roose et al., Don’t Tilt Scales Against Trump,
Facebook Executive Warns, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
01/07/technology/facebook-trump-2020.html (reporting on a leaked internal memo
of a Facebook executive crediting Trump’s effective use of the platform’s advertising
tools for his 2016 victory); supra notes 156–62 and accompanying text.
190. Jack Dorsey (@jack), TWITTER (Oct. 30, 2019, 4:05 PM), https://twitter.com/jack/
status/1189634360472829952?s=20 [https://perma.cc/C4S9-VX9R]; see Kate Conger,
Twitter Will Ban All Political Ads, C.E.O. Jack Dorsey Says, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/30/technology/twitter-political-ads-ban.html.
191. Ellen L. Weintraub, Don’t Abolish Political Ads on Social Media. Stop Microtargeting,
WASH. POST (Nov. 1, 2019, 6:51 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/2019/11/01/dont-abolish-political-ads-social-media-stop-microtargeting.
Following Commissioner Weintraub’s recommendation in part, Google announced that it
will not allow political ad targeting on the basis of public voter records (e.g., party
affiliation) or political characteristics such as “left-leaning,” “right-leaning,” or
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By contrast, Facebook continues to justify the free reign it gives politicians
to spread disinformation in terms of its “fundamental belief in free
expression” and “respect for the democratic process.”192 Expanding on this
justification, the company asserts that “by limiting political speech we would
leave people less informed about what their elected officials are saying and
leave politicians less accountable for their words.”193 Likewise, echoing
Zuckerberg, other Facebook executives have contended that it would be
inappropriate for Facebook to be “the arbiter of what’s true and what’s false”194
or otherwise “referee political debates and prevent a politician’s speech from
reaching its audience and being subject to public debate and scrutiny.”195
C. Critiques
Facebook’s assertedly hands-off approach to the speech of politicians
may lend credence to its ostensibly principled defense of “expression,”
“voice,” and non-interference with political discussion out of “respect for
the democratic process.” But Facebook’s free speech and democratic
process justifications for singularly exempting politicians from its
Community Standards and fact-checking policy do not withstand scrutiny.
Simply put, Facebook is not a neutral platform that promotes an open
marketplace of ideas or facilitates robust public debate across the political
spectrum. Quite the opposite. The company takes an aggressive hands-on
approach to censoring and shaping political speech that divides and
distorts democratic deliberation in a number of harmful ways.
First, Facebook heavily filters and skews what every user sees based on
content and viewpoint. The platform employs machine-learning
algorithms that continually adapt and narrow each user’s news feed “to
connect people to the stories they care about most,” based on their
“connections and activity on Facebook.”196 The predictable, widely

“independent.” Daisuke Wakabayashi & Shane Goldmacher, Google Policy Change Upends
Online Plans for 2020 Campaigns, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/11/20/technology/google-political-ads-targeting.html. However,
advertisers may still target users based on a host of other personal characteristics, such as
age, gender, location, searches, visited websites, and watched videos. See id.
192. Fact-Checking on Facebook, supra note 180.
193. Fact-Checking on Facebook, supra note 180.
194. Foreign Influence Operations’ Use of Social Media Platforms: Hearing Before the S.
Select Comm. on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 43 (2018) [hereinafter Sandberg Senate
Testimony] (testimony of Sheryl Sandberg, Chief Operating Officer, Facebook).
195. Clegg, supra note 176.
196. Publishing News Feed, FACEBOOK BUS., https://www.facebook.com/help/
publisher/275495073088478 [https://perma.cc/3LDH-4S5T]; How News Feed Works,
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reported result of this unrelenting drive to maximize user engagement and
retention is the rise of social media bubbles that largely echo and reinforce
users’ political interests and biases.197 As one commentator observed,
“Rarely will our Facebook comfort zones expose us to opposing views,” “we
eventually become victims to our own biases,” and “a critical eye grows less
keen the more it is ambushed with one-sided propaganda.”198
Facebook’s politically skewed, source-narrowing feeds—what its former
vice president for user growth described as “dopamine-driven feedback
loops”199—are all the more concerning considering that nearly half of
Americans get news through Facebook.200 While these personalized feeds
may keep users coming back for more pleasingly-bespoke content, they do
not broaden, balance, or otherwise promote open and informed public
discussion. Instead, they divide the electorate into polarized realities based
on disparate streams of “alternative facts.”201

FACEBOOK HELP CTR., https://www.facebook.com/help/1155510281178725/?helpref
=hc_fnav [https://perma.cc/95GF-QJMT]; see Isaac, supra note 143.
197. Isaac, supra note 143; see Callum Borchers, Facebook Invites You to Live in a Bubble
Where You Are Always Right, WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2018/01/14/facebook-invites-you-to-live-in-abubble-where-you-are-always-right (arguing that Facebook’s newsfeed “changes seem
to make it easier than ever to create filter bubbles that block out opinions that don’t
match your own”); Alex Hern, How Social Media Filter Bubbles and Algorithms Influence the
Election, GUARDIAN (May 22, 2017, 9:14 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2017/may/22/social-media-election-facebook-filter-bubbles
[https://perma.cc/4UCS-72MQ] (discussing the outsized impact Facebook had in the
2018 parliamentary election in the United Kingdom and noting that “more than 60% of
Facebook users are entirely unaware of any curation on Facebook at all”); Alexis C.
Madrigal, What Facebook Did to American Democracy, ATLANTIC (Oct. 12, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/10/what-facebook-did/542502
(arguing that Facebook had a profound impact on the 2016 election and that Facebook’s
primary “draw is its ability to give you what you want” in terms of news and other media).
198. Mostafa M. El-Bermawy, Your Filter Bubble Is Destroying Democracy, WIRED (Nov.
18, 2016, 5:45 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/11/filter-bubble-destroyingdemocracy [https://perma.cc/M3RG-D9GW].
199. See Amy B. Wang, Former Facebook VP Says Social Media Is Destroying Society with
‘Dopamine-Driven Feedback Loops’, WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 2017, 1:37 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/12/12/former-facebook-vpsays-social-media-is-destroying-society-with-dopamine-driven-feedback-loops.
200. See John Gramlich, 10 Facts About Americans and Facebook, PEW RES. CTR. (May 16,
2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/05/16/facts-about-americans-andfacebook [https://perma.cc/93CU-D7Z7].
201. In 2017, Kellyanne Conway, Counsel to President Trump, coined the term
“alternative facts” during a television interview to describe what her interviewer
rebuked in response as “not facts” but “falsehoods,” and the phrase has been derisively
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Second, as scrutinized in Part I, the Community Standards do “referee
political debates” among its billions of users, censoring an extensive amount
of speech that might offend.202 To add examples to those discussed above,203
none of Facebook’s ordinary users could, hypothetically speaking,
characterize Mexicans as “rapists” or African nations as “shithole countries”;
describe white supremacists as “very fine people”; call Christians “bigoted” or
white people “racist”; or argue that women “should not be allowed to work.”
Each of these sentiments would violate at least one do-not-post rule.204
However, posts denouncing such hate speech (e.g., “white supremacists are not
very fine people”) would survive censorship, even though they would be just
as political. Hence, Facebook hardly serves as a politically neutral marketplace
of ideas where users can “talk openly about the issues that matter to them, even
if some may disagree or find them objectionable,”205 “inform themselves” of
what others are saying, and hold others “accountable for their words.”206
Third, at least in theory, Facebook further referees the political speech of
ordinary users by labeling and throttling the distribution of content that its
fact-checking partners deem false or misleading.207 Setting aside the
desirability or effectiveness of this fact-checking policy,208 its existence on
top of the feed curation and Community Standards undercuts
Zuckerberg’s assertion that the “private company” should not “censor
politicians or the news.”209 It censors the latter quite extensively.

used as code for just that. Haan, supra note 11, at 18. Facebook Chief Operating Officer
Sheryl Sandberg, apparently without irony, touted the company’s efforts to present
users with “alternative facts” as part of its fact-checking efforts. See id. at 19.
202. See Clegg, supra note 176; Sandberg Senate Testimony, supra note 194, at 43.
203. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 71, 100 and accompanying text. One qualification to the above
examples is that Facebook apparently allows otherwise forbidden hate speech for
“criticism of immigration policies and arguments for restricting those policies.” Hate
Speech, supra note 90. So, while a non-politician could not generally call Haiti, El
Salvador, or African countries “shithole countries,” they could if arguing that the
United States should not accept more immigrants from those nations. Cf. Ibram X.
Kendi, The Day Shithole Entered the Presidential Lexicon, ATLANTIC (Jan. 13, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/01/shithole-countries/580054.
This qualification does little to mitigate the amount of censorship of political speech
on Facebook beyond licensing hate speech in the immigration context.
205. Community Standards, supra note 7.
206. Fact-Checking on Facebook, supra note 180.
207. See supra notes 182–83 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 184–86 and accompanying text.
209. See Mark Zuckerberg Stands for Voice and Free Expression, supra note 31; supra note
149 and accompanying text.
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Fourth, Facebook’s exemption of politicians from its speech code and fact
checking creates a two-tier speech platform that, as one commentator put it,
“treats people who aren’t politicians as second-class citizens.”210 Of course,
politicians at the national level already enjoy considerable access to news
coverage and have an outsized voice on social media by virtue of their
position and prominence.211 Facebook amplifies these powerful advantages
by inviting them to speak without restraint and selling them access to the
targeting tools that can optimize the spread of their speech, including, if they
choose, hate or lies.212 While an opposing politician may offer a fact-check, if
not “alternative facts,” Facebook’s algorithmic feed works to keep such
displeasing counterspeech out of partisan bubbles.
Consequently, Facebook’s special solicitude toward politicians
promotes a race to the bottom in which willing ones may take the low road
of spreading lies that they perceive to be politically advantageous.213 A
recent study published in Science by researchers at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology generally supports such a perception.214 Using a
dataset of approximately 126,000 verified true and false news stories
spread on Twitter from 2006 to 2017, the study found that “[f]alsehood
diffused significantly farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly than the
truth in all categories of information.”215 Furthermore, it found that “the
210. Gilad Edelman, How Facebook Gets the First Amendment Backward, WIRED (Nov. 7,
2019, 5:28 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/facebook-first-amendment-backwards
[https://perma.cc/53L5-KX9L].
211. See U.S. Political Leaders Have a Sizable Following Among U.S. Adults on Twitter, PEW
RESEARCH CTR. (July 12, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/07/15/
about-one-in-five-adult-twitter-users-in-the-u-s-follow-trump [https://perma.cc/DE2MBR29] (noting that one-in-five adults on Twitter follow Trump).
212. It is not clear whether the Community Standards would allow non-politicians
to express agreement with a hateful sentiment by a politician which would otherwise
violate the rules. Facebook does not say one way or another, and either way would raise
questions regarding the consistency and coherence of the company’s line-drawing.
213. In the 2020 Presidential election cycle, Warren and several other Democratic
candidates pledged not to spread disinformation online. See Cat Zakrzewski, The
Technology 202: Several Presidential Candidates Have Yet to Promise Not to Spread
Disinformation, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
poweporst/paloma/the-technology-202/2020/01/30/the-technology-202-severalpresidential-candidates-have-yet-to-promise-not-to-spread-disinformation/
5e31bdbb88e0fa6ea99d6f61. So far, Trump has made no such commitment.
214. See Soroush Vosoughi et al., The Spread of True and False News Online, 359
SCIENCE 1146, 1148 (2018); see also Robinson Meyer, The Grim Conclusions of the LargestEver Study of Fake News, ATLANTIC (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/
technology/archive/2018/03/largest-study-ever-fake-news-mit-twitter/555104.
215. Vosoughi et al., supra note 214, at 1147.
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effects were more pronounced for false political news” than other kinds
of news, perhaps because of the sensational novelty.216
Since Twitter’s timeline serves content based on whom users follow
and how users and their social network previously interacted with
content,217 the study’s findings would apply to similar “social
technologies,” such as Facebook’s personalized feed, that “facilitate rapid
information sharing” and “can enable the spread of misinformation.”218
Indeed, the viral spread of the doctored Pelosi video among millions of
users on Facebook and Twitter illustrates the potency of sensational false
political news.219 In addition, user comments responding to the video on
conservative Facebook pages (e.g., mocking Pelosi as “drunk” or “a
babbling mess”) illustrate the confirmation bias fostered by algorithms
designed to serve users content that, in Zuckerberg’s words, “matches
their lived experience” without “getting in the way of an ability to
express something that they feel is real.”220
To be sure, the doctored Pelosi speech fell under Facebook’s factchecking policy because it was not the “direct speech” of a politician but the
creation of an anonymous user.221 However, Facebook only flagged the
content as “false” and demoted it in users’ feeds after it had gone viral and
drawn national media attention.222 Zuckerberg himself conceded, in response
to criticism from Pelosi and others, that “[i]t took a while for our systems to flag
that,” during which time “it got more distribution than our policies should have
allowed.”223 But not only was Facebook’s fact-checking concededly too-littletoo-late. As Professor Sarah Haan has argued, Facebook’s fact checking itself
may reinforce lies as truths. In a “post-truth” world, the “binary construction”
of a fact check may ingrain a “two-sided view of information that may
increase polarization and partisanship, not diffuse it,” by presenting users
with “alternative facts” that match their political preferences.224

216. Id. at 1146.
217. See About Your Twitter Timeline, TWITTER HELP CTR. https://help.twitter.
com/en/using-twitter/twitter-timeline [https://perma.cc/T65A-AC3F].
218. Vosoughi et al., supra note 214, at 1146.
219. See Harwell, supra note 150.
220. Id.; Newton, supra note 26.
221. See supra note 187.
222. See Kurt Wagner, Facebook CEO: Company Was Too Slow to Respond to Pelosi
Deepfake, BLOOMBERG (June 26, 2019, 6:25 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2019-06-26/facebook-ceo-company-was-too-slow-to-respond-to-pelosideepfake [https://perma.cc/6HU2-EYZ6].
223. Id.
224. See Haan, supra note 11, at 34–35.
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Fifth, a race to the bottom by politicians willing to spread disinformation
could spiral down further with the rise of deepfakes. These are highly
manipulated media, such as photos, videos, or audio, that could make
someone appear to say or do something that they did not say or do (e.g.,
making a racist remark or participating in a sex video), or distort something
that someone said or did to make them seem to say or do something else
(e.g., speaking with a drunken slur or touching someone inappropriately).225
Following controversies over the spread of the doctored Pelosi video and
other manipulated media on the platform, in January 2020, Facebook added
to the Community Standards a deepfake ban against “[v]ideo”—but not
other media—that “has been edited or synthesized” in ways that “would likely
mislead an average person to believe that a subject of the video said words
that they did not say,” and “is the product of artificial intelligence or
machine learning.”226 Ironically, this peculiarly limited ban would not seem
to apply to the Pelosi video, as the manipulation slowed her words but did
not insert different ones, and it was made with low-tech video editing
software rather than AI or machine learning.227 Moreover, the ban does not
appear to apply to politicians, as nothing in this addition to the Community
Standards states or suggests that it overrides the categorical exemptions for
politicians that Facebook has so vigorously defended.228 Thus, Facebook’s
extremely narrow deepfake ban invites evasion and leaves politicians free
to exploit another powerful tool to deceive the electorate.

225. See Ian Sample, What Are Deepfakes—And How Can You Spot Them?, GUARDIAN
(Jan. 13, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/jan/
13/what-are-deepfakes-and-how-can-you-spot-them [https://perma.cc/G9CZ-LDP9].
226. Manipulated Media, Community Standards, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.
com/communitystandards/manipulated_media [https://perma.cc/3YS2-7MKE]; see
Monika Bickert, Enforcing Against Manipulated Media, FACEBOOK (Jan. 6, 2020),
https://about.fb.com/news/2020/01/enforcing-against-manipulated-media
[https://perma.cc/5XMA-DZQF].
227. See Tony Romm et al., Facebook Bans Deepfakes, But New Policy May Not Cover
Controversial Pelosi Video, WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 2020, 3:56 PM), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/01/06/facebook-ban-deepfakes-sources-saynew-policy-may-not-cover-controversial-pelosi-video. Additionally, the deepfake ban
exempts “parody or satire” or manipulations that “omit words that were said or change
the order,” which gives users plenty of license to make politicians appear to say
something entirely different from what they said. Manipulated Media, supra note 226.
228. Facebook has not claimed that the ban applies to politicians, but a spokesperson
has issued conflicting statements about whether the ban applies to political ads. See Romm,
supra note 227 (explaining that Facebook has declined to send political ads with
manipulated media to third-party fact-checkers or label the ads as false but subsequently
claimed that it may do so with respect to “highly manipulated video”).
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By contrast, Twitter recently adopted a broader policy that governs
“deceptively . . . synthetic and manipulated media . . . [that] are likely to cause
harm.”229 The policy applies to politicians and non-politicians alike and
extends to media that has been “significantly and deceptively altered or
fabricated” and “shared in a deceptive manner,” regardless of the technology
used to produce it.230 Twitter states that it will remove the media if it is “likely
to cause harm,” defined to include non-violent harms such as “voter
suppression or intimidation.”231 Otherwise, Twitter will label the media as
deceptively manipulated, reduce its distribution, and “provide additional
context.”232 Under this deepfake policy, the Pelosi video would likely draw
at least the remedial steps for deceptively manipulated media. Thus, as with
its complete ban on political ads, Twitter has gone much farther than
Facebook in adopting policies to suppress disinformation.
Finally, the privileged class whom Facebook frees from the constraints of
its speech code and fact checking, and to whom it sells the keys to its ad
targeting kingdom, possesses regulatory power over the company and could
wield that authority in ways that threaten its existence. Indeed, some
politicians, including Warren and other prominent Democrats, have called
for a break-up of Facebook for antitrust, privacy, and electoral integrity
reasons.233 On the other end of the political spectrum, prominent
Republican politicians such as Trump have threatened to regulate the
platform to combat alleged anti-conservative bias.234 Freeing politicians
229. Yoel Roth & Ashita Achuthan, Building Rules in Public: Our Approach to Synthetic
& Manipulated Media, TWITTER BLOG (Feb. 4, 2020), https://blog.twitter.com/en_
us/topics/company/2020/new-approach-to-synthetic-and-manipulated-media.html
[https://perma.cc/JH7M-SG3E].
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. See Elizabeth Warren, Here’s How We Can Break Up Big Tech, MEDIUM (Mar. 8,
2019), https://medium.com/@teamwarren/heres-how-we-can-break-up-big-tech-9ad 9e0
da324c [https://perma.cc/Y8X3-Y767]; cf. Marcy Gordon, US Senator Asks Facebook CEO
Mark Zuckerberg to Sell Instagram and WhatsApp, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 20, 2019, 5:52 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/us-senator-josh-hawley-asks-mark-zuckerberg-break-upfacebook-instagram-whatsapp-2019-9
[https://perma.cc/7Q3T-EX6N]
(discussing
Republican Senator Josh Hawley’s suggestion to Zuckerberg to sell off WhatsApp and
Instagram). Biden has also advocated making Facebook at least civilly liable for the
falsehoods that it posts. See Editorial Board, Opinion, Joe Biden: Former Vice President of the
United States, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2020/01/17/opinion/joe-biden-nytimes-interview.html.
234. Emily Stewart, Silicon Valley Should Take Josh Hawley’s Big War on Big Tech
Seriously, VOX (Oct. 29, 2019, 6:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/10/
29/20932064/senator-josh-hawley-tech-facebook-google-mark-zuckerberg-missouri
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from Facebook’s content moderation and fact checking may not appease
Democratic critics,235 but it does mitigate the pressure Facebook faces from
powerful politicians such as Trump who want to speak freely (including
falsely) on Facebook.236 Moreover, Trump’s reelection campaign is
currently the platform’s top spender on political ads.237 Thus, Facebook’s
exemption of politicians from its speech restrictions and fact checking
furthers both its political interests and its business interests.
Of course, it might be risky in the long run to appease some politicians,
including the current White House occupant, at the cost of antagonizing
others, including possibly the next one. But it makes some near-term
political and business sense to adopt policies that align with the political
opponent of the person calling for the break-up of the company. Along
these lines, it is notable, though perhaps coincidental, that Zuckerberg had
two meetings with Trump in 2019, the first a week before Facebook
announced its exemptions for the speech of politicians, and the second a
month later with Facebook board member and prominent Trump
supporter Peter Thiel.238 Democratic critics panned these meetings as
“corruption, plain and simple,” and accused Facebook of “potentially
tailoring its ad policy in order to appease the Trump administration and
the right so they do not get regulated.”239

[https://perma.cc/LN5R-3QNR]. As noted, such claims of political bias lack empirical
support. See Ingram, supra note 164.
235. See supra notes 146, 162 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. It is well documented that Trump
has lied prolifically as a politician. See Glenn Kessler et al., President Trump Made 16,241
False or Misleading Claims in His First Three Years, WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2020, 3:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/01/20/president-trump-made16241-false-or-misleading-claims-his-first-three-years.
237. Facebook Ad Library Report, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/ads/
library/report [https://perma.cc/U7GK-EFQG] (providing totals for political ad
campaign spending on Facebook from January 1, 2019 through March 14, 2020).
238. See Lizette Chapman & Gerrit De Vynck, Peter Thiel Pledges to Support Trump’s
2020 Campaign, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 1, 2018, 7:23 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2018-11-01/peter-thiel-praises-trump-pledges-to-support-his-2020-campaign
[https://perma.cc/4E9U-X6UD]; Eric Lutz, Mark Zuckerberg Had a Secret Dinner with Trump
and Peter Thiel, VANITY FAIR (Nov. 21, 2019), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/
2019/11/mark-zuckerberg-donald-trump-secret-dinner; Jordan Novet, Facebook’s Zuckerberg
Met with President Trump at the White House, CNBC (Sept. 19, 2019, 7:27 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/19/facebook-ceo-mark-zuckerberg-met-presidenttrump-at-the-white-house.html [https://perma.cc/J8WQ-NSG5].
239. Cristiano Lima, Democrats Pound Facebook over Zuckerberg’s Secret Dinner with
Trump, POLITICO (Nov. 21, 2019, 10:02 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/
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CONCLUSION
Though the length of this Article may try even the proverbial Patient
Reader,240 it has only scrutinized a small selection of Facebook’s sprawling
speech restrictions in its Community Standards.241 There is much more that
free speech scholars can study and should critique about the Community
Standards.242 After all, in extensively restricting the speech of billions
worldwide and hundreds of millions in the United States, Facebook’s speech
code is the most far-reaching and among the most consequential in history.

2019/11/21/elizabeth-warren-zuckerbergs-secret-dinner-with-trump-072410
[https://perma.cc/6EZT-7HTJ].
240. Cf. Samuel Johnson, A Study of Milton’s Paradise Lost, in 1 LIVES OF THE ENGLISH
POETS, at 183 (George Birkbeck Hill ed., 1905) (writing of Milton’s epic poem, “None
ever wished it longer than it is”).
241. In addition, this Article has not discussed the outside board that Facebook has
proposed to resolve content disputes, which Zuckerberg likened to “a Supreme Court”
for Facebook. Ezra Klein, Mark Zuckerberg on Facebook’s Hardest Year, and What Comes
Next, VOX (Apr. 2, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/2018/4/2/17185052/markzuckerberg-facebook-interview-fake-news-bots-cambridge [https://perma.cc/UT3ATKFP]. As currently conceived, this external board will be comprised of “independent
experts” in many “relevant disciplines,” from “content” and “civil rights” to “safety” and
(thank goodness) “free expression.” FACEBOOK, DRAFT CHARTER: AN OVERSIGHT BOARD
FOR CONTENT DECISIONS 1, https://about.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/
draft-charter-oversight-board-for-content-decisions-2-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TKSB6U2]. Its primary responsibility will be to “review Facebook’s most challenging
content decisions” in “enforcing our Community Standards,” and it will have the power
to reverse them. Id. at 3. However, it is questionable whether the board can be truly
independent of Facebook. For one, its initial members will be selected by Facebook,
and though the board will select future members, Facebook can continue to nominate
candidates. See id. at 2. Furthermore, funding for the board’s operations will come
from Facebook, and there is no guarantee that Facebook will fund or even maintain
the board in the long term. See id. at 4. More fundamentally, the board will only
interpret and apply the Community Standards that Facebook has promulgated and
alone has power to revise—including in response to board decisions. Thus, as the top
executive and controlling shareholder of Facebook, Zuckerberg retains the ultimate
power to dictate what is or is not said on Facebook, as well as whether any speakers get
favorable treatment. This is a far cry from an independent supreme court in a
constitutional democracy that enforces fundamental rights, including robust free
speech and due process rights, that cannot be rewritten by the government. See
Daphne Keller, Facebook Restricts Speech by Popular Demand, ATLANTIC (Sept. 22, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/09/facebook-restricts-free-speechpopular-demand/598462. For these and other reasons, it is highly unlikely that the
proposed board can ameliorate the main problems with Facebook’s speech code and
policies, except perhaps to mitigate some of their vagueness.
242. Cf. Andrew Marvell, To His Coy Mistress, in MISCELLANEOUS POEMS 19 (1681)
(“Had we but World enough, and Time . . . .”).
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To be clear, this Article is not advocating that Facebook stop
operating as a neutral platform that refuses to censor political speech
and lets users decide for themselves what is true or false. Facebook
cannot stop being what it is not. In addition to censoring a wide range
of political speech through its Community Standards, Facebook
effectively censors the content that users see through leveraging
machine learning to narrow their feeds to match their political interests
and biases rather than to broaden or balance their exposure. While
Facebook might thereby maximize user satisfaction and retention, it also
facilitates a ruinous race to the bottom in which potent disinformation
by politicians spread virally and gain credibility among millions of
primed supporters in polarized social media bubbles. Facebook reaps
the gains, but our democracy reaps the costs.
It is difficult to imagine a speech platform more optimized to distort
democratic discussion and divide the electorate than Facebook. It is not
too early—and, hopefully, it is not too late—to scrutinize Facebook’s
speech platform as it is, not as the company passes it off to be.

